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The University of North Dakota 198A
Faculty Advisor: Dr. Don M, Tucker
This study attempted to investigate and interpret 
subjects' reports of the sources of self-knowledge in light 
of the growing 1 ucerature .about the shortcomings of social 
judgment. The basic tenet of this study was the subjects' 
tendency to report self-observation at the expense of feed­
back and social comparison as the best source of self- 
knowledge is based on an Implicit evaluation bias similar to 
Schlenker's (1980) notion of "self-projection" and Jellison 
and Greens' (1981) "norm of internality." It was predicted 
that subjects’ Intuitive notions about the sources are such 
that self-observation is seen as a generally "better" way to 
learn things about yourself than feedback which, in turn, is
better than social comparison.
These hypotheses were tested by having subjects read 
four short stories in which either a male or female charac 
ter learns something good u* bad about him or herself
1
through one of the sources of self-knowledge (self- 
observation, unsolicited feedback, solicited feedback, 
social comparison or a no source ending group). They then 
rated the characters on semantic differential type items and 
rated the source itself for "accuracy," "reliability" and 
"believeability." A1 ..hough the measure of primary impor­
tance in this study was the character ratings, it was 
assumed that these ratings would be made in congruence with 
the implicit evaluative notions about the different sources. 
An additional set of measures used in this study was a 
ranking procedure similar to those used by Schoeneman (1981) . 
Several personality scales (Self-Consciousness Scale, State- 
Trait Anxiety Scale, Social Desirability Scale and The Self- 
Monitoring Scale) were also included in an exploratory part 
of this study.
Results from the ranking portion of this study repli­
cated the results of Schoeneman (1981) quite closely 
demonstrating that the present subjects report the source of 
self-knowledge in a similar manner to those reported in 
earlier studies. Several significant and theoretically 
consistent differences were found between the source of 
self-knowledge groups on the character rating measures. The 
predictions that self-observation would be seen most 
favorably, social comparison would be reported least 
favorably and solicited feedback would be reported more 
neutrally were generallyjsupported. Predictions regarding 
unsolicited feedback and the no source ending group were not
2
supported; they were reported as much worse and better, 
respectively, than was expected. Examination of the inde­
pendent variables "trait valence," subject sex and character 
sex produced a variety of main effects and interactions 
which are typically consistent with findings already 
reported in the sex-role stereotype literature. The only 
personality scale which produced any theoretically meaning­
ful results was the social anxiety subscale of the Self- 
Consciousness Scale which showed that high social anxiety 
subjects report sources as the best and worst in a pattern 
nearly opposite that of the majority of subjects.
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ABSTRACT
This study attempted to investigate and interpret 
subjects' reports of the sources of self-knowledge in light 
of the growing literature about the shortcomings of social 
judgment. The basic tenet of this study was the subjects' 
tendency to report self-observation at the expense of 
feedback and social comparison as the best source of self- 
knowledge is based on an implicit evaluation bias similar 
to Schlenkers (1980) notion of "self-projection" and 
Jellison and Greens' (1981) "norm of internality." It was 
predicted that subjects’ intuitive notions about the sources 
are such that self-observation is seen as a generally 
"better" way to learn things about yourself than feedback 
which, in ttirn, is better than social comparison.
These hypotheses were tested by having subjects read 
four short stories in which either a male or female char­
acter learns something good or bad about him or herself 
through one of the sources of self-knowledge (self­
observation, unsolicited feedback, solicited feedback, 
social comparison or a no source ending group). They then 
rated the characters on semantic differential type items 
and rated the source itself for "accuracy," "reliability" 
and "believeability." Although the measure of primary
xi
importance in this study was the character ratings, it was 
assumed that these ratings would be made in congruence with 
the implicit evaluative notions about the different sources. 
An additional set of measures used in this study was a 
ranking procedure similar to those used by Schoeneman 
(1981). Several personality scales (Self-Consciousness 
Scale, State-Trait Anxiety Scale, Social Desirability Scale 
and The Self-Monitoring Scale) were also included in an 
exploratory part of this study.
Results from the ranking portion of this study repli­
cated the results of Schoeneman (1981) quite closely 
demonstrating that the present subjects report the source 
of self-knowledge in a similar manner to those reported in 
earlier studies. Several significant and theoretically 
consistent differences were found between the source of 
self-knowledge groups on the character rating measures. The 
predictions that self-observation would be seen most 
favorably, social comparison would be reported least 
favorably and solicited feedback would be reported more 
neutrally were generally supported. Predictions regarding 
unsolicited feedback and the no source ending group were not 
supported; they were reported as much worse and better, 
respectively, than was expected. Examination of the inde­
pendent: variables "trait valence," subject sex and character 
sex produced a variety of main effects and interactions 
which are typically consistent with findings already 
reported in the sex-role stereotype literature. The ->nly
xxi
personality scale which produced any theoretically meaning­
ful results was the social anxiety subscale of the Self- 
Consciousness Scale which showed that high social anxiety
■subjects report sources as the best and worst in a pattern
|1 | v . ^ i o  \
nearly opposite that of the majority of subjects.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
How do I xcarn things about myself? For example, do I 
know that I am friendly because I can see I have many 
friends or because others tell me I am friendly or perhaps 
because I seem friendlier than my peers? How accurate and 
reliable are these ways of learning about myself? Is 
noticing my own behavior the best way (since I can only 
really depend on myself) or are other people even more 
important in these decisions (because they may provide a 
standard with which I may compare myself)?
Such questions and answers are examples of those a 
person might ask him or herself and they also exemplify an 
area of social psychology called "implicit personality 
theory." In this area the focus of study is on the average 
person’s intuitive ideas about the structure and .processes 
of personality.
One of the first researchers to study people's impres­
sions of personality was Asch (1946) . In his classic 1946 
study, he gave brief descriptions of a target individual to 
subjects who then rated the individual’s personality on a 
variety of dimensions. The results of his investigations 
indicated that the words "warm” or "cold" embedded in
1
2identical lists of adjectives had a significant impact on 
subjects' perceptions of the target individual. "Warm" and 
"cold" tended to serve as central organizing concepts such 
that a warm individual was likely to be seen not only as 
warmer but also as friendlier, kinder, moj e honest and 
generally better than his or her cold counterpart. In 
recent years investigators have become interested in how 
people .make use of central organizing concepts, such as 
warm or cold. They have termed these organizing concepts 
"schemas."
Schema is a generic term for a variety of knowledge 
structures that people use to understand the everyday world. 
Wegner and Vallacher (1977) note that early writers, such as 
Heider, suggested that schemas are "perceptual good 
figures--just as a person tends to see a circle with a small 
segment missing as a circle nonetheless, he sees groups in 
particular ways because they look better, more complete, and 
less confusing" (1977, p. 196). While such gestalt explana­
tions do not enjoy much popularity today, this quote 
illustrates that schemas do have heuristic value as a form 
of social shorthand. Perhaps the best known form of 
schemas are the person-schemas more commonly known as 
stereotypes and schemas for sequences of events known as 
scripts (Nisbett & Ross 1980).
Schemas are only one type of social judgment heuristic 
that people use in everyday life. Tverskv and-Kahneman 
(1982) have identified two other heuristics, availability
3and representativeness. These heuristics together with 
schemas allow social judgments to be made with a minimum of 
effort. People use ease of recall, (availability) as an 
implicit measure of likelihood or frequency of events and 
use resemblance (representativeness) as a categorization or 
classification standard. Thus, schemas and judgmental 
heuristics may be considered as tools of social judgment 
because they allow decisions to be made in a relatively 
fast and easy manner. However, as with most "fast and 
easy" methods or shortcuts there are liabilities associated 
with their use. The tools of social judgment do often 
produce characteristic errors such as stereotyped percep­
tions of people. ' In addition, these tools may be used in 
inappropriate situations and can also be used to supply 
information to fill in for "missing data."
Schlenker (1930) and Jellison and Green (1981) suggest 
that our tools of social judgment also affect our self- 
perception and self-presentation. Both research and 
personal experience suggest that, there are schemas, with an 
evaluative component to them, common to most members of a 
given culture. In other words these can be considered as 
stereotypes (i.e., schema or script) with a characteristic 
evaluation aspect (i.e., most people see the stereotype as 
good or bad). Consider the standard script for greeting a 
friend we haven't seen for months, in response to a hearty 
"How are you?," the expected response is "Fine, and how are 
you?" The poor soul who answers this "question" with a
4listing of personal troubles will now have another problem: 
he or she has violated a social norm. Another example is 
the "norm of internality" where individuals who cite 
internal causes of behavior receive more social approval 
than those citing external causes (Jellison & Green 1981).
Given that peoples' tools of social judgment affect 
not only decisions but evaluations of people and events a 
unique theoretical framework to investigate people's 
implicit notions of personality is provided. In the open­
ing remarks of this section allusions were made to several 
questions which might be investigated. One particularly 
interesting question is "How do people report the ways in 
which they learn things about themselves?"
Schoeneman (1981) was the first to study the above 
question; he called this area the study of "Reports of the 
Sources of Self-Knowledge." He used as response categories 
three forms of self-validation from the social psychological 
literature: self-observation (Bern 1972); social feedback
(Cooley 1902; Mead 1934); and social comparison (Festinger 
1954). Results from his studies indicate that college 
students (Schoeneman 1981; Nash & Schoeneman Note 1) endorse 
self-observation as the best way to learn something about 
themselves, followed by feedback and comparison. Similarly, 
children also rate self-observation as the "very best" 
source of self-knowledge (Schoeneman, Tabor & Nash Note 2). 
While these studies do not indicate hox<' people actually find 
things out about themselves, they do suggest a tendency, or
5perhaps a bias, to report self-observation as the best 
source of self-knowledge. These results have suggested to 
Schoeneman (1981) and Nash and Schoeneman (Note 1) that the 
subjects' desire to respond in a way which will make them 
appear in the best possible light may be responsible for the 
consistent pattern in which the sources of self-knowledge 
are reported.
It may be that the tendency to report self-observation 
as the best source of self-knowledge is a function of one's 
tools of social judgment. Indeed, it is the hypothesis of 
this study that subjects' selections of the sources of self- 
knowledge may be accounted for by the implicit social 
desirability of each source. For example, it may be that 
self-observation is "representative" of a better stereotype 
while social comparison is "representative" of less desira­
ble stereotypes. Schoeneman (1981) presented very similar 
arguments when he suggested that self-observation may be 
associated with such typically American values as 
independence and self-reliance while comparison involves 
reliance on others, and possibly suggests uncertainty or 
other unfavorable dispositions.
In the present study, university students were pre­
sented with several brief narrative accounts of people who 
learned things about themselves by using the different 
sources of self-knowledge. Dependent measures were obtained 
from the subjects' impressions of the self-learners and of 
the way in which they learned about themselves. As part of
this study it was also possible to look for relationships 
between anxiety (Spielberger et al. 1968), self-monitoring 
(Snyder 1974), self-consciousness (Fenigstein, Scheier &
Buss 1975) , social desirability (Crowne & Marlowe 1964), 
and subjects’ reports of the sources of self-knowledge.
Before the study is characterized in more specific 
detail, it is appropriate to review some relevant literature 
To add clarity and organization to this task several parts 
will be considered independently before bringing together 
information from each area and forming the experimental 
questions. Following is a review of Schoeneman's work with 
reports of the sources of self-knowledge, a look at the 
tools of social judgment such as schemas and heuristics, 
and finally an examination of how these tools of social 
judgment affect our self-presentation.
CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Reports, of the Sources of Self-Knowledge 
The empirical study of people's reports of the sources 
‘of self-knowledge is a relatively new area of interest in 
the field of social psychology. Schoeneman (1981) studied 
college students' reports of the importance of three dif­
ferent self-validational processes: self-observation, 
feedback from others and social comparison. Schoeneman 
(1981) notes that the concept of self-observation is found 
in work by Bern (1967, 1972) and Duval and Wicklund (1972); 
it is defined as a condition in which an individual is 
attending to his or her own thoughts, feelings and behav­
iors. The concept of feedback from others comes from the 
tradition of symbolic interactionism (Cooley 1902; Mead 
1934). This source of self-knowledge involves evaluating 
and making inferences from implicit and explicit feedback 
from others. The final source is social comparison 
(Festinger 1954) which involves comparisons between an 
individual's and others' thoughts, feelings and behaviors.
Studies using reports of these three sources of self- 
knowledge as dependent variables have yielded a consistent 
pattern of results. When asked the question "What is the
7
8best way for you to learn something about yourself?," 
college students overwhelmingly report self-observation as 
the preferred mode of self-validation followed by feedback 
and social comparison (Schoeneman 1981, Nash & Schoeneman 
Note 1). Indeed, in both of these studies two independent 
sets of response measures, a free response method involving 
subjects writing brief paragraphs and a ranking procedure, 
yielded similar patterns of results. Use of the free 
response method allowed the "number of mentions" for each 
source to be calculated and produced ratios of 7:2:1 (for 
self-observation:feedback:social comparison), which, gives 
some idea of the direction and magnitude, of the self­
observation preference. The ranking variables also produced 
similar results. In another study, Schoeneman, Tabor and 
Nash (Note 2) found that children aged four to eight select 
self-observation as the "very best" source much more often 
than feedback or social comparison.
Thus, studies to date indicate that subjects quite 
consistently report self-observation, to the exclusion of 
the more social sources, as the best way to learn something 
about themselves. Schoeneman (1981) has postulated three 
ways in which to account for these findings: subjects are, 
in fact, telling us how they learn about themselves; sub­
jects are responding based on the relative perceptual 
salience of each source; or that subjects are responding 
based on an impression management or self-presentation 
strategy.
9Evidence to date seems to point toward the latter 
hypotheses. There seems to be little justification to 
believe that subjects are producing‘a correct introspective 
account of their sources of self-knowledge (Nisbett & Wilson 
1977). Similarly, at least one study which investigated the 
salience account failed to find support-for this hypothesis 
(Nash & Schoeneman Note 1).
Nash and Schoeneman (Nope 1) used two sets of manipula­
tions to change the relative perceptual salience of each 
source in an attempt to influence subjects' reports of the 
sources of self-knowledge. One set of manipulations was 
the wording of stimulus questions. Subjects were given the 
same type of personally worded open ended questions as in 
Schoeneman1s (1981) study: ”1 have come to know I am a(n)
(adj ective) person from________________ . " The wording "I"
was predicted to direct attention to the self, making it 
more salient, resulting in higher numbers of self-observa­
tion responses, This was contrasted with an impersonal 
wording, ’'People come to know: that they are (adjective)
people from ______ _ ______ which was expected to make the
self less salient and the social sources more salient and 
hence reported more often.
The second set.of manipulations involved having sub­
jects complete the stimulus materials exposed to a facial 
mirror or an operating video camera in an attempt to induce 
states of private or public self-awareness (Buss 1980). 
Private self-awareness is a state where attention is
10
directed toward private inner experiences such as thoughts 
and feelings. 'The increased attention to the private self 
was expected to make self-observation more salient, result­
ing in more reports of this source. Alternatively, public 
self-awareness, a state where attention is directed toward 
aspects of the self that can be readily observed by others, 
was expected to increase reports of the social sources as a 
function of the increased attention to the public self.
Thus, in each case the self-awareness manipulation serves 
to make different sources more ’'available" (Tversky & 
Kahneman 1974) and hence more likely to be reported 
(Scheier, Buss & Buss 1978). However, the results of this 
study provided no support for the salience hypothesis; 
neither set of manipulations had any effect on subject’s 
responses.
Schoeneman (1981) has reported some support for the 
self-presentation account. In one study subjects' reports 
were correlated with the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability 
Scale (Crowne & Marlowe 1964). He found that social desira­
bility was significancly correlated with percent mention of 
social comparison (r [67] - -0.22) and with average rank of 
feedback (r [67] - -0.23).
In a separate investigation he asked college students 
to indicate which of the sources of self-knowledge was Che 
best under four instructional conditions. They were to 
report which was best in order: i) to appear in the best 
possible light, ii) to appear in the worst possible light,
11
iii) to answer as most college students would, iv) to 
answer as truthfully and honestly as possible.
The results of this study show the "best light" and 
"truthful" conditions were quite similar, and that "worst 
light" and "other students" were also nearly identical (see 
Table 1).
. TABLE 1
PERCENT OF SUBJECTS CITING EACH SOURCE FOR FOUR 
IMAGINAL CONDITIONS (SCHOENEMAN 1981)
Imaginal Condition ■:
Source of Self-Knowledge
Self- . 
Observation Feedback
Social
Comparison
Best light 51 35 14
Worst light 24 25 51
Truthful and honest 52 39 9
Like other college
students 21 34 40
It Is curious that subjects’seem to evaluate self- 
observation so positively and social comparison so nega­
tively while feedback remains relatively unchanged. 
Schoeneman (1981) suggests that self-observation and social 
comparison may vary more since these processes require more 
effort and must be intentionally initiated, while feedback 
may not always require such an active role. Thus, the 
element of subjective effort tells us that the self-learners
12
want to know something about themselves and the way subjects 
report going about this may then be important. It is possi­
ble that, for example, social comparison may violate the 
"norm of internality" (individuals who report internal 
causes for behavior receive more social approval than those 
citing external causes [Jellison & Green 1981]) and as 
Schoeneman (1981) suggested may imply uncertainty or other 
unfavorable dispositions. In contrast, a self-observer may 
seem more in touch with him or herself. Indeed, it is just 
such a hypothesis we. will investigate in the present study.
In general it is hypothesized that there is an implicit 
relationship between the sources of self-knowledge and a 
good-bad evaluative dimension. This relationship may be 
thought of as analogus to Asch's (1946) finding of a rela­
tionship between "warm-cold" and "good-bad" or Jellison and 
Green's (1981) finding of a relationship between "internal- 
external" attribution and "good-bad."
Self-observation is predicted to be seen as a subjec­
tively "better" way of self-validation than social comparison 
or feedback. An individual's cognitive representation of 
the concept of self-observation, or a self-observer, may be 
organized such, that: there is an implicit evaluative judg­
ment of the concept and those who use it. Similar organizing 
concepts, with accompanying evaluative components, may also 
exist for feedback and social comparison. The basic 
hypothesis of this study is that there is an intuitive 
relationship between the cognitive representations of the
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sources of self-knowledge and culturally shared assumptions 
about human behavior.
Before specifying more clearly the parameters of the 
study though, it is appropriate to review some additional 
areas which will provide the theoretical basis for the 
investigation. The major area to be examined will be one 
which focuses on the tools of social judgment, that is, 
intuitive principles of person perception. Central to this 
discussion will be a. look at human inference strategies such 
as schemas, scripts, stereotypes and judgmental heuristics. 
An important facet of these discussions will deal with the 
frequent inappropriate use of these strategies. Here the 
focus will be on the shortcomings of social judgment; situa­
tions in which people fail to correctly determine the 
causes of behavior. Indeed, in man}7, cases biased reports 
are related to the tools of social judgment which often 
involve "logical shortcuts.” The.final area to be reviewed 
will deal with impression management. In particular 
research will be examined which suggests that impressions 
may be unintentionally and unknowingly biased to endorse 
certain traits or personality characteristics more favorably.
This will lay the groundwork for a discussion of the 
present study, an investigation of reports of the sources 
of self-knowledge as a function of implicit impression 
management biases. .
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The Tools of Social Judgment: Schemas 
and Judgmental Heuristics
The empirical study of social judgment has its roots 
in Asch's classic 1946 study "Forming Impressions of Person­
ality." Interestingly enough, in the intervening years, 
his experimental design for studying person perception has 
not been significantly improved upon (Krauss 1981). Perhaps 
the major change in the Asch (1946, 1952) paradigm for 
investigating impressions of personality has been to rename 
this area "person perception" (Schneidec, Hastorf, & 
Ellsworth 1979).
In the Asch (1946) study, subjects rated an individual 
on a variety of bipolar descriptors, such as shrewd-wise, 
unhappy-happy, ruthless-humane, and strong-weak, after 
hearing one of the following sets of descriptions of the 
individual: i) intelligent-skillful-industrious-warm-
determined-practical-cautious or ii) intelligent-skillful- 
industrious-cold-determined-practical-cautious. Of course, 
these sets of descriptors are identical except for the 
words "warm" or "cold." His results indicated that these 
words had a pronounced effect on subject's impressions of 
the target individual. Asch reports that "these results 
show that a change in one character-quality has produced a 
wide-spread change in the entire impression. Further, the 
written sketches show that the terms ’warm-cold’ did not 
simply add a ne* quality, but to some extent transformed 
the other characteristics" ' (1946, p. 264).
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Thus, Asch's data clearly showed that people are quite 
willing to organize impressions and even infer traits based 
on central organizing concepts like warm or cold. What 
Asch did not fully address was what are these "central 
organizing concepts" and how do they work. This is the 
topic to be covered in the present section. It will be 
shown that Asch’s central organizing concepts are merely 
one of the many tools of social judgment that people use.
Before starting the discussion of specific tools of 
social judgment a note of caution is in order. Much of the 
research into these concepts has focused on the liabilities 
associated with their use. Thus, the following discussion 
may, unintentionally, seem to indicate that social judgment 
is always very poor. In a discussion of the magnitude of 
social judgment errors, Wegner and VaJ.lacher (1981) perhaps 
sum up the current state of this area when they say that 
bias is not as p-et'vasive as some (Ross 1977; Nisbett & 
Wilson 1977) indicate or that attributional accuracy is not 
as good as others (Kelley 1967) indicate. The present 
author agrees with the position that bias does exist in 
some situations which may be clearly specified. However, 
the tools of social judgment also have advantages already 
mentioned such as ease and speed in making decisions.
Indeed, Nisbett and Ross (1980) point out that the overall 
liabilities of misattribution in everyday life are small 
and the damage produced by biased judgments is probably 
minimal. With these thoughts in mind, the discussion will
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move on to the. specific tools of social judgment and their 
liabilities.
Schemas
Returning to a discussion of Asch's (1946) study for a 
moment, recall that he found that not only could subjects' 
impressions be dichotomized based on warm-cold polarities 
but that "warm" individuals were also seen as being more 
good natured, socially popular, generous, humorous and 
humane. Indeed, as Wishner (1960) found by re-examining 
Asch's data there were strong correlations among certain 
traits which seem to suggest that these traits were per­
ceived to go togehter by Asch's subjects. Implicit "going 
together" such as this has been called by many names: 
schemas, personae, stereotypes, prototypes and scripts 
(Taylor & Crocker 1981; Nisbett & Ross 1980). While some 
of these terms may be differentiated from others (i.e., 
schemas are a general term referring to knowledge struc­
tures; personae, stereotypes and prototypes are person- 
schemas and scripts are event-schemas) they are all similar 
in that they are knowledge structures (Nisbett & Ross 1980). 
While the present discussion deals primarily with the social 
psychological aspects of schemas, it should be noted that 
schemas are by no means limited to just this one area of 
psychology (Neisser 1976). For our purposes of studying 
person perception, Nisbett and Ross provide a good defini­
tion of person schemas; they are "knowledge structures
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representing the persons"! characteristics and typical 
behaviors of particular 'stock characters'" (1980, p. 35).
Currently schema theory has unfortunately not reached 
a point where the properties of schemas c?n be confidently 
defined, and there, are also still questions about the type 
of function they serve and the conditions under which they 
are used (Nisbett & Ross 1980). Taylor and Crocker (1981) 
indicate that most studies of schemas have merely been demon 
strations of the presence of schematic effects and that 
schematic hypotheses are typically not formulated in a 
manner allowing them to be shown false. Keeping in mind 
that schema theory is somewhat lacking in scientific rigor, 
let us continue our discussion by examining the known 
properties of schemas.
Asch's study illustrates how schemas function: they 
tell us what someone should be like but less about what they 
should not be like (Taylor & Crocker 1981). We know "warm" 
people are good natured and so on, but what traits fail to 
appear in "warm" individuals? Schemas seem to serve a 
heuristic function by allowing us to say that a prototypical 
or "good" representation of the schema has a high number of 
traits in common with other schema members and a low number 
of traits in common with nonmembers, but they provide no 
information about what traits should not appear (Rosch & 
Mervis 1975; Cantor & Mischel 1977). As Nisbett and Ross 
(1980) point out, schemas are not the results of veridical 
data observation, storage and recall. Rather, our schemas
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seem to influence both our perception and our interpretation 
of events and vice versa (Tayloi* & Crocker 1981) . These two 
functions will be examined in more detail in the following 
sections.
Perceptual Aspects of Schemas
In this section we will examine the effects that 
schemas have on the encoding and storage components of 
memory. When someone observes an event, schemas impose 
order and structure on the events they are seeing. Thus, 
when seeing a social interaction one is not likely to see 
it as a. chaotic series of random events. Depending on what 
is known, or is thought to be known, about the situation it 
will probably be seen as containing some meaningful struc­
ture such as grouping or temporal sequence (Taylor & Crocker 
1981) . Consider the following example from Taylor and 
Crocker:
Suppose we see a room full of people chatting pleas­
antly and' drinking. There are roughly equal numbers 
of men and women, and one man in the corner is talking 
at length to a group of assembled listeners. If x^ e 
are told that this is an office party, we will 
probably assume, however incorrectly, that the men 
are executives, and the women are secretaries, and 
the pontificating individual in the corner is the 
boss. Informed that the same group is a room full of 
friends, xve will assume that the people are of eqxial 
status, the men and xvomen are husbands and wives, and 
the pontificating individual is merely pompous (1981, 
p. 94).
In. addition to lending structure and organization to 
events, schemas help determine whether or not information 
x>7ill be encoded or retrieved from memory. When facing a
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social situation such as the one presented above for 
example, there are potentially counrless details one might 
remember. The way in which the situation is organized by a 
schema will have a pronounced effect on what is recalled 
about that situation. Research suggests that the mere 
presence of an organizing schema will facilitate recall, 
especially for schema-consistent information (Ailport & 
Postman 1947, Cantor & Mischel 1977; Owens, Bower & Black 
Note 3). In the present discussion, encoding and retrieval 
effects are discussed together since studies have found 
evidence for both types of effects and a discussion of the 
relative strength of these effects is beyond the scope of 
the present project (see Bower Note 4 and Rothbart, Evans 
& Fulero 1979 for a fuller account).
In addition to affecting encoding and recall of events, 
a large body of literature suggests that schema-consistent 
information is processed more quickly than schema inconsist­
ent information. Markus (1977) found that schemas affect 
processing time, problem solving speed and information flow 
speed. Taylor and Crocker (1981) suggest that most of the 
studies on which the information processing conclusions have 
been drawn are somewhat simplistic compared to the typically 
complex social schemas. However, they do feel that some 
degree of generalization to social schemas may be warranted 
and hypothesize that social schemas allow for generally 
shorter information processing latencies.
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Interpretative Aspects of Schemas
In this section topics more germane to the present 
study will be examined: such as the way schemas are used to 
interpret meaning and make decisions. The reader may note 
some similarity between topics discussed here and those 
mentioned in the previous section. This similarity is 
unavoidable since some blurring of events occurs during the 
rapid flow of the information processing sequences. This 
is due, in part, to the current inability of schema theory 
to differentiate these effects more clearly. Indeed,
Nisbett and Ross (1980), in reviewing the current state of 
schema research, note that even the dynamics of schema 
arousal, how we call up a given schema in a given situation, 
are not clearly understood. (Two of the most promising 
leads, the availability and representativeness heuristics 
(Tversky & Kahneman 1974), will be dealt with in more detail 
in later sections.) The focus in this section will be on 
three major interpretation functions of schemas: providing 
an evaluative framework in which to view events, helping 
people predict future events, and helping people make 
decisions often using incomplete data. Several of these 
functions, especially the last one, will also illustrate 
how interpretations based on schemas may not always be 
accurace.
It was noted earlier that schemas tend to provide a 
framework in which to view events. It should come as little 
surprise then that schemas affect how a situation is
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evaluated. Existing schemas are often used as criteria for 
evaluating experience. This is especially true in situa­
tions in which someone has schema-based expectations prior 
to stimulus situations being encountered. In such a 
situation, a comparison is made between the current situa­
tion and previously generated expectations. Recalling 
Taylor and Crocker’s (1981) example of the room full of men 
and women, if one is led to believe it is either an office 
party or a group of friends the observed behaviors will be 
compared to very different sets of standards. Recall the 
lecturing boss (or the pompous friend). Our evaluation of 
this individual depends on two things: the desirability or 
value of the social role and the degree to which he or she 
fulfills that role (Higgins & Rholes 1976). Thus, a boss 
who commands the attention and respect of his or her subor­
dinates may be seen positively while a friend displaying the 
same behaviors will be- seen less positively since lecturing 
to one's friends is a poor fulfillment of the friend role.
Some research suggests that both transient emotional 
or situational effects and more long term personality 
characteristics of the perceiver may have an impact on what 
is seen. For example Feshback and Feshback (1963) found 
that scared children rate photographs of other children as 
being scared while controls do not. Dornbush et al. (1965) 
found that when two people observe someone, their descrip­
tions overlap by 45% but when one person describes two 
different people the overlap is 57%. Wegner and Vallacher
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(1977) interpreted this as evidence that both who we are and 
how we feel affects our judgments of others.
A second general interpretative aspect of schemas 
involves using them to predict future events or behaviors. 
Having a schema for events or types of persons likely to be 
encountered provides ono which behavioral expectations for 
these situations (Abelson 1976; Scrunk & Abelson 1977). For 
example most people have a going to a movie "script." This 
script provides a framework to predict the sequence of 
events involved in going to a movie: arriving early to 
purchase tickets at a ticket booth, having one’s ticket torn 
in half before entering the theater, going through the 
lobby and buying popcorn or a snack, being seated and remain­
ing quiet during the movie and leaving after it's over.
Interestingly enough scripts and schemas may also 
change future events. Rosenthal and Jacobsen's (1968) 
demonstration of the "Pygmalion effect" demonstrated that 
leading teachers to believe in a "late bloomer" schema 
actually led to increased levels of academic performance in 
the "late bloomer" children (although it must be noted that 
this study has been severely critized on methodological 
grounds). Other researchers have also demonstrated similar 
effects for attributes as diverse as perception of physical 
attractiveness (Snyder, Tanke & Berscheid 1977), expectation 
of aggression (Snvder & Swann 1976) , and expectation of 
personality traits (Snyder & Swann 1978).
A third way in which schemas affect interpretation of
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events is by supplying "missing data." When presented with 
a stimulus situation which is incomplete in some aspect, a 
schema may fill in the missing data with schema-consistent 
information (Taylor & Crocker 1981) . Once again recall the 
example of the group of men and women standing in a room 
talking. How were the individuals dressed? If the occasion 
was the office party the probable reply would be suits for 
the men, pantsuits or perhaps dresses for the women, while 
jeans or causal wear would be a more likely answer if the 
group were friends. A better, and more natural, example of 
an intrusive schema effect-may be found in the suggestion 
to recall the above example. It was stated that the group 
was standing in a room when in fact this information was 
not given in the scenario and is a schema-consistent infer­
ence (to this author). This schema-consistent inference 
was not inserted to "test" the reader's ability to detect 
intrusive errors but is one that escaped the present 
author's notice during earlier drafts of this paper.
The type of error made by this author is quite similar 
to those reported by Cantor and Mischel (1977, 1979) and 
Cohen (1977) for people to believe that new, schema- 
consistent, information has been presented earlier. Indeed, 
the inference Ct^ated by this author was treated in exactly 
such a manner. Not only did he believe that the people 
were "standing” but that he had read this earliei*.
Taylor and Crocker (1981) consider the tendency for 
inconsistent or irrelevant data to be accepted as schema-
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consistent a "type one" error: as in this term's statisti­
cal sense it means accepting a wrong hypothesis as being 
correct. They postulate four ways in which this may happen: 
(1) the possibility that the schema is stored with a data 
base-of confirming instances; (2) criteria for matching 
schemas are so general that neutral and negative instances 
are accepted; (3) in the rare case of schematic disconfir- 
mation the schema is not revised but further differentiated 
in a "yes, but . . . "  manner; (4) schemas are only checked 
one at a time and after the first confirming schema is 
found, additional processing or cross-checking with other 
schemas is stopped.
A result,of these "type one" errors may be that schemas 
frequently are unknowingly used in inappropriate or wrong 
situations. Langer and Abelson (1974) had subjects listen 
to a structured conversation between two men under the 
instructional set that the situation was either a psychiat­
ric intake or a job interview. Not surprisingly, in the 
former condition subjects heard more "pathology" than in 
the latter condition. Also of interest is the fact that no 
subjects contested the idea that the situation was either 
an intake or interview. Indeed, subjects had no trouble 
finding "evidence" on which to base interpretations of the 
person's job or psychiatric status. Other data also 
suggests that at times schemas can be quite global and 
undifferentiating. Miyamoto and Dornbush (1956) found that 
subjects perceived that I.Q., self-confidence, physical
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attractiveness and likableness were all correlated. Koltov 
(1962) and Berman and Kenney (1976) suggest that such 
implicit going together are reminiscent of Asch's findings 
and may be due to connotative or semantic similarity 
between traits rather than empirical correlation of these 
attributes. Such indications that "good things go together" 
will be an important part of the present study. However, 
before going into a discussion of the implications of 
schemas for this study the. discussion of tools of,social 
judgment will continue with a look at judgmental heuristics.
Heuristics
As has been seen in earlier sections, when people are 
facing a decision they often use intuitive tools of social 
judgment such as schemas. In a series of papers Tversky 
and Kahneman (1971, 1973, 1974; Kahneman & Tversky 1972, 
1973; also see Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky 1982) identified 
two additional tools of social judgment: the availability 
and representativeness heuristics. These heuristics are 
similar to each other and to schemas, because they are used 
as "logical shortcuts" in decision making. By "logical 
shortcuts" it is meant that these heuristics are not formal 
decision making strategies in which evidence is carefully 
examined in an explicit and invariant manner. Rather, they 
are informal strategies which tend to be used automatically 
and typically without careful consideration of their appro­
priateness (Nisbett & Ross 1980). Even so, these relatively
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simple heuristics probably result in more correct decisions 
than incorrect ones with a great savings of time and energy. 
Indeed, as Nisbett and Ross (1980) stress, such "strategies" 
are invaluable for organisms such as humans who must make 
many decisions and inferences. The present discussion of 
heuristics, however, will focus primarily on liabilities 
associated with heuristic use. This will be done since 
these aspects of heuristics are both better understood and 
more relevant for this project.
Representativeness
The representativeness heuristic refers to a method 
for assessing the degree to which a given stimulus or event 
is representative, or similar, to a class or set of stimuli 
or events. Put more simply, this heuristic refers to the 
"goodness of fit" between the situation being evaluated and 
its presumed characteristics (Nisbett & Ross 1980). In the 
present discussion, three types of situations where the 
representativeness heuristic is frequently used will be 
presented.
The first type of situation in which representativeness 
is used is when someone has to predict an outcome or the 
chance that an event will happen based on prior knowledge 
about the upcoming event. In this case the judgment of 
"representativeness" is based on the similarity of outcome 
and origin. Fob example consider the following problem 
posed by Nisbett and Ross: "Subjects are asked to assess
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the relative likelihood of three particular sequences of 
births of boys (B) or girls (G) for the next 6 babies born 
in the United States. Those sequences are i) BBBBBB, 
ii) GGGBBB, iii) GBBGGB" (1980, p. 24). They suggest most 
subjects will select the third choice (GBBGGB) as the most 
likely since it seems more "representative" of the process 
of birth, i.e., birth is seen as a chance event with the 
liklihood of a boy or girl seemingly equal. Intuitively, 
choices i) and ii) both seem too orderly and do not capture 
the spirit of the "random" process and would seem poor 
choices. By now a reader well versed In probability theory 
may have calculated that the probabilities of all three 
sequences are nearly identical. The first sequence is 
reported by Nisbett and Ross to actually be the most likely 
since there are more boy than girl babies born while choices 
two and three are equally likely.
Another closely related situation where representative­
ness produces incorrect decisions is the well-noted 
"gamblers fallacy" (Tversky & Kahneman 1974). In this 
example after a long run of "heads" in a coin toss or "reds" 
on a roulette wheel people often believe that "tails" or 
"black" becomes more likely. This is because on the next 
trial a different outcome is seen as being "due" to give the 
appearance of a "random process." As in the previous example 
a run of events, be it boy births or heads in a coin toss, 
does not seem as representative of a chance process as does 
a mixed up order.
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The representativeness heuristic is also used to make 
decisions in the opposite situation: judging the similarity 
of antecedents to consequences. Here one is faced with 
determining the cause of some existing event. In the 
process of finding causal agents, people often look for 
something which resembles or is representative of the cur­
rent situation. Evidence to the strength of this heuristic 
is plentiful in the medical folklore of primitive, and not 
so primitive, cultures where a cure is often no more than 
the opposite of a symptom. Indeed, in nineteenth century 
medicine this "property" was known as the "doctrine of 
signatures" and suggested that "the lungs of a fox must be 
a specific remedy for asthma, because the animal is remarka­
ble for its strong powers of respiration. Tumeric has a 
brilliant yellow color, which indicates it has the power for 
curing the jaundice" (Mill 1974, p. 767).
The final use of the representativeness heuristic to be 
considered involves assessments of the degree of similarity 
between instances and categories. This type of task usually 
is of the form "Is part A a member of class 1 or class 2?" 
Consider the following description of a university profes­
sor. He is a shy individual who is small in stature and 
likes to read and write poetry. Is he a professor of 
psychology or a professor of Chinese studies? Nisbett and 
Ross (1980) suggest most people will answer "Chinese 
studies" since the data presented seem more in character, or 
representative, of someone in Chinese studies. If one
considers this thought experiment in light of the actual 
numbers of professors in each field a very different answer 
is suggested. Most universities have relatively larger 
psychology departments, and simple base rates, the only real 
objective criteria, would predict he was a psychologist.
Taylor and Crocker (1981) approach representativeness 
in a different manner, suggesting a relationship between the 
degree of representation and schemas. Their position holds 
that before representativeness can be judged, a schema must 
be present to be used as a standard. Thus, in the above 
example, before deciding which field the professor is in, 
we must examine schemas for "Chinese studies professors" 
and "psychology professors." Only then can our decision, 
based on resemblance, be made. Unfortunately, research into 
representativeness, as was the case with schema research, 
fails to specify any precise guidelines by which to evaluate 
the degree of representativeness (Nisbett & Ross 1980) .
Thus researchers cannot currently make formal specifications 
of the "degree" of representativeness or whether or not a 
schema must be present as a standard of comparison and this 
heuristic can only be used as an explanatory construct.
The representativeness heuristic may be involved in 
subjects' reports of the sources of self-knowledge. For 
example, does social comparison seem representative of dif­
ferent personality traits than the other sources? Self- 
observation seems more representative of values regarded 
positively in this country such as independence, individuality
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or self-reliance while social comparison seems representa­
tive of less-positively valued attributes (Schoeneman 1981). 
As the arguments for the present study are developed such a 
role for representativeness will be predicted; that some 
sources are representative of more socially approved traits 
than others .
Availability
Like representativeness, the availability heuristic is 
an informal decision making strategy. Tversky and Kahneman 
define availability in the following manner: "People 
assess the frequency of a class or the probability of an 
event by the ease with which instances or occurrences can 
be brought to mind" (1974, p. 1127). They go on to say that 
availability based decisions seem to be a function of any 
of the following factors; the differential retrievability 
of examples, the efficiency of memory search set, the dif­
ferential imaginability, of instances or through illusory 
correlation. In the following discussion, each of these 
types of availability bias will be examined and examples of 
each will be given. Most of these examples are hypothetical 
ones; however, they are modeled quite closely on the exten­
sive work of Tversky and Kahneman (see Kahneman, Slovic, & 
Tversky 1982 for an excellent compilation of this work and 
other research into heuristics and judgment order uncer­
tainty) .
The first type of availability effects to be examined
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will be those based on the retrievability of examples. In 
this case estimates of the size of a class of events or the 
subjective probability of an event's occurrence are based 
on the ease of recall. A class will appear larger if its
examples are easier to retrieve than another class of the'
same size with harder to retrieve examples. Tversky and 
Kahneman (1973) illustrated tins.in a study in which lists 
with equal numbers of men and women were presented to sub­
jects. The "availability" manipulation consisted of 
including either several famous men's or women's names on 
these lists. They found that the sex with the well known, 
and more available, examples was consistently estimated as 
being the longer list.
Another way of approaching the retrievability of 
examples is by use of the "vividness" criteria. That is, 
vivid or concrete examples are more available and carry more 
decision making weight than pallid information such as 
statistical base rates. Consider the effects of almost 
having a car wreck. The subsequent liklihood of having an 
accident has not changed but the subjective liklihood has 
greatly increased and the driver is quite likely to drive 
slower and with greater caution for some time to come. This 
heuristic is also made use of by advertisers who try to sell 
products based not on empirical product performance but use 
much more vivid testimonials in which a person tells us "I 
know product X . . . .  " This strategy seems to work too 
because people will often overlook truly "informative"
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information to make use of less informative but more vivid 
and interesting data.
A second type of availability use is based on the 
efficiency of memory search set. Again an example from 
Tversky and Kahneman's (1982) will be used to illustrate 
availability principles. Subjects were asked "Are there 
more words which begin with the letter R or have R as the 
third letter?" Tversky and Kahneman's subjects gave the 
former answer more often while the latter one is the correct 
answer; there are more words with R in the thix*d position.
The basis of these findings seems to be that it is easier to 
recall words beginning with R (such as ripe, read or relax) 
than words with R as, the third letter (such as error, street, 
or care). By way of analogy consider the following library 
problem. Imagine the relative difficulty of finding books 
about "Australia" compared to finding books by Australian 
authors. Nisbett and Ross (1980) suggest the greater ease 
in finding books about Australia tells us little about the 
library's holdings but a great deal about its cataloging 
system. Similarly, Tversky and Kahneman's example with the 
letter R tells us more about the memory search process than 
actual frequencies of words.
Another factor which, affects availability is the dif­
ferential imaginability of instances. Consider a question 
such as "How many psychologists are there in North Dakota?"
A graduate student or professor of psychology might over 
estimate the number in the state. After all, consider the
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high number of such a person's friends and acquaintances who 
are psychologists and the low number of non-psychologists 
known. A rancher in western North Dakota would probably 
answer with a much lower estimate since he or she may know 
of no psychologists, most of his or her friends are probably 
other ranchers. Thus, the number of examples of a class are 
often used to assess the size of that class. This illus­
trates another aspect of the availability heuristic, the 
non-random "sample" of events on which our availability 
decisions are based. The rancher and the professor although 
they live in the same state are likely to have experienced 
very different aspects of the state yet both may feel they 
are typical North Dakotans. Unless they take the non­
randomness of their experiences into account, i.e., thinking 
"Most of my friends are psychologists but that's because 
I'm here at UND; if I were in mother part of the state I 
would see fewer psychologists," estimates based on availa­
bility are likely :o be. iu error. , -
The fourth and final factor which Tverskv and Kahneman 
(1974) suggest may account for the availability heuristic 
is illusory correlation. Illusory correlation will be dis­
cussed in more detail than the other causes of availability 
because of its importance to the present study and the 
widespread attention it has received outside of Tversky and 
Kahneman's investigations.
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Illusory Correlation
Since this topic was first investigated it has been 
called by many names: correlational bias, illusory correla­
tion, perceived co-occurrence or simply errors in.detecting 
covariation (Tversky & Kahneman 1974, Nisbett & Ross 1980; 
Taylor & Crocker 1981). All of these labels seem to be 
describing similar phenomena so for simplicity's sake the 
term illusory correlation will be used in the present 
discussion. Illusory correlation is a condition in which 
events or stimuli are perceived to co-vary although empiri­
cal studies show (or would likely show) no such relation­
ships. More simply put, they are relationships between 
stimuli which "ought” to exist yet do not (Jennings, Amabi?a 
& Ross 1982).
Several of the studies presented in earlier sections 
demonstrating schemas and heuristics can be re-interpreted 
using the concept of illusory correlation.
Studies such as Miyamoto and Dornbush (1956), Koltov 
(1962), Berman and Kenney (1976) and even Asch (1946) all 
demonstrate illusory correlations between personality 
traits. For example, Miyamoto and Dornbush found that I.Q. 
and physical attractiveness were perceived to correlate. 
There is no actual correlation, of course, between these 
attributes yet subjects consistently report one. Similarly 
Asch's findings of implicit "going together" of traits is 
an example of subjects' beliefs in nonexistent relation­
ships. Some authors (Jennings, Amabile & Ross 1982) have
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also noted that Thorndike’s (1920) notion of the halo effect 
is also an example of illusory correlation because this 
effect found that good traits (or items) tend to be 
associated with good traits (or items) and negative ones 
with negative ones.
Perhaps the most famous studies in illusory correla­
tional bias were the ones done by the Chapmans (Chapman & 
Chapman 1967, 1969). They found that, certain psychometric 
indicators used by clinicians were erroneous and that lay 
people, when asked to .interpret ’’test data,” generated and 
believed similar indicators to be true. It seems that 
subjects were making a "correlational analysis” where seman­
tic relationships were confused and possibly interchanged 
with real relationships (Golding & Rorer 1972). The 
Chapmans found that emphasis on the eyes on'the Draw-a- 
Person Test led subjects to diagnosis "patients” as being 
suspicious. There is no empirical relationship between 
this indicator and suspiciousness but there is some face 
validity to such a sign. Perhaps large eyes seem repre­
sentative of suspicious people or people equate 
suspiciousness with "prying eyes” making eyes more available.
Several writers have proposed that corr'elat ion, in 
general, is a concept few understand. Schweder notes that 
while most people have a correct intuitive perception of 
concepts such as class inclusion, antonymy, synonymy, part- 
whole, and temporality, statistical terms such as 
correlation are non-intuitive ones for which foi'mal training
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is needed in order to be understood (Schweder 1977;
Smedslund 1963). Jenkins and Ward (1965) similarly propose 
that people misunderstand contingency and confuse it with 
desired outcome.
Schweder, in his 1977 discussion of correlation in 
personality judgments, presents a unique conceptual approach 
to this issue. His basic hypothesis sounds quite similar to 
those of Tversky and Kahneman (1974) and Golding and Rorer 
(1972) ; we rely on likeness and not likelihood in making 
"correlation” estimates. Given that correlation is a non- 
.intuitive concept, he believes that resemblance is used as 
a fundamental conceptual device by both primitive and 
advanced cultures and often results in "magical thinking."
He defines this magical thinking in the following manner.- 
"magical thinking (confusing propositions about the world 
with propositions about the language) is an expression of 
a universal disinclination of normal adults to draw corre­
lational lessons from their experience" (1977, p. 647).
Taylor and Crocker (1981) suggest that schemas may 
have a twofold impact on illusory correlation: first, 
schemas may influence the type of evidence use in assessing 
co-occurrence, and secondly schemas may make some evidence 
more available and hence over-utilized in making judgments.
It was noted earlier that schemas tend to facilitate memory 
searches for schema-consistent information while ignoring 
inconsistent or irrelevant information (Allport & Postman 
1947; Jenkins & Ward 1965; Snyder & Swann 1978; Crocker &
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Taylor note 6). Such biased recall effectively "loads the 
dice" since our co-variation assessment is made against 
confirming instances, and this suggests the second way that 
schemas are implicated in illusory correlation: they make 
those schema-consistent examples more available. As Taylor 
and Crocker suggest "if one can recall more schema-consist­
ent (such as extraverted salesman), than schema-inconsistent 
(introverted salesman)., or irrelevant (dependent salesman) 
instances than schema-consistent instances should be over­
represented in judgments of covariation" (1981, p. 122).
Thus, illusory correlations seem to involve schemas 
and both the availability and representativeness heuristic. 
This produces a confusing state of affairs because differ­
ent writers propose different explanatory roles for these 
three tools of social judgment in explaining illusory 
correlation. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) originally 
subsumed illusory correlation under the concept of the 
availability heuristic. The logic here was that the 
strength of associative bonds was responsible for the per­
ceived correlation. Conversely Jennings, Amnbile and Ross 
(1982) suggest representativeness as the key element under­
lying illusory correlation while Taylor and Crocker (1981) 
propose schemas and representativeness as being responsible 
for illusory correlation. Indeed, it seems likely that any 
or all of these tools of social judgment may serve a 
function in this concept and future research seems to be 
the only solution to the current state of affairs.
38
While it is regrettable that illusory correlation is 
not better understood, it will still be an important concept 
in the present study. Before beginning the discussion of 
the study, however, one last area of literature will be 
reviewed: the effects of people's tools of social judgment
on perceptions of themselves and others.
Social Judgment, Self-Presentation 
and Self-Projection
In this section schematic processing and attributional 
biases such as Illusory correlation will be examined in 
light of self-presentation theory. So far much of the 
groundwork for the present study has been set; showing how7 
global judgmental strategies such as schemas and heuristics 
are often used inappropriately in evaluating situations and 
people. One key factor which has only been alluded to is 
how and why might one schema seem preferable or better than 
another. ■ In this section that question will be answered by 
showing that, just as people have implicit personality 
theories, there is also an implicit evaluative component to 
these theories which may best be approached through the 
self-presentation literature.
Like many topics in the social sciences, self­
presentation is a very broad one encompassing many aspects 
of human behavior. This topic, which is also called 
impression management, was defined by Schlenker as
the conscious or unconscious attempt to control 
images that are projected in real or imagined social 
interactions. When the images are self-relevant, the
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behavior is termed self-presentation. We attempt to 
influence how others, real or imagined, perceive our 
personality traits, abilities, intentions, behaviors, 
values, physical characteristics, social character­
istics, family, friends, job and possessions. In so 
doing we often influence how we see ourselves (1980, 
p • 6) .
Such a definition is broader than the traditional interpre­
tation of self-presentation which denotes a pragmatic, 
motivated effect in which public statements are used to 
protect the private self-image (Allport 1937; Heider 1958). 
However, a distinction can be made between two types of 
self-presentation. Self-presentation, as we will be using 
It in this study, does not refer to the overt calculated 
variety which may be used to ingratiate oneself to someone. 
The discussion will center on a second type which is in many 
respects similar to attributional and schema bias.
Schlenker has suggested calling this form "self- 
projection” to avoid the above mentioned Machiavellian con­
notations and is described as "well-ingrained habitlike 
responses that are triggered In particular situations and 
need not involve intentional subterfuge" (1980, p. 7). In 
discussing this type of self-presentation effect Schlenker 
(1980) notes that explanatory constructs such as schemas or 
scripts are necessary. Self schemas or self constructs 
(Epstein 1973; Markus 1977) are thought to be used in this 
case in a summary capacity which aids organization and 
attention to various aspects of the self. It is important 
to reiterate here that self schemas, like other types of 
schemas, are not so much dictated by reality as they are
used to make subjective realities (dchlenker 1980). Schemas 
seem _o serve several important functions in maintaining the 
self-concept. They are important because they allow a life­
time of experience to be organized in a manageable way which 
also facilitates the maintenance of self-esteem (Epstein 
1973). They are also important in terms of self-presentation 
since a belief that we have a certain attribute, i.e., 
independence, leads us to act in ways which express that 
belief--by acting independent (Carson 1969).
Indeed, self-schemas raise the question of whether 
self-presentation effects are due to public descriptions or 
private perceptions. The traditional manipulative forms of 
impression management suggest that they are likely a 
function of overtly managed public descriptions designed to 
fulfill a purpose. Such an overt description bias seems 
less likely with the "self-projection" form. Evidence to 
date is mixed with some studies finding evidence for biased 
private perceptions (Miller 1976; Sicoly & Ross 1977; Garn 
a Rosenburg 1981; Greenberg, Pyszczynski & Solomon 1982; and 
Reiss, Rosenfeld, Medburg & Tedeschi 1981) while others find 
evidence for biased public descriptions (Ajzen & Fishbein 
1975. Miller & Ross 1975, Brewer 1977). A definitive answer 
is currently eluding self-presentation researchers although 
evidence does seem to be very suggestive that biased private 
perceptions are involved (Schlenkex* 1980) .
In a related vein researchers are reporting tendencies 
for schemas (and self-schemas) to be used in congruence with
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stereotypic and other culturally shared beliefs (Rothbart, 
Evans & Fulero 1979; Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff « Rodemann 1978). 
Langer (1978) suggests that schemas may be acquired, at 
either conscious or unconscious levels, and used without the 
benefit of critical or evaluative judgments. For example 
consider such culturally shared schemas as "fat people are 
jolly," "blondes have more fun" or scripts such as the 
obligatory smile when the boss tells a tired old joke 
(Schlenker 1980) . These are probably schemas or stereotypes 
which most people are aware of and which may influence their 
behavior. Thus, it seems that schemas and schematic-based 
stereotypes can, at times, act like culturally shared norms 
to which there is implicit agreement.
Additional evidence for cognitive bias in self­
presentation was found by jellison and Green (1981). They 
propose the existence of a "norm of internality” which 
stresses greater value on internal, as opposed to external, 
attributions. They found that people implicitly judged 
othei*s by this norm, believed themselves to be "more inter­
nal" than others and also described themselves as being 
"more internal" than others when asked to make a good 
impression. Thus, jellison and Green argued that there is 
an implicit "goodness" to internal attributions used in 
both judgment of others and presentation of the self. This 
finding is of great interest in explaining subjects’ reports 
of the sources of self-knowledge since there is one source, 
self-observation, which is more "internal" than the other
sources. Based on Jellison and Green's findings, it can be 
argued that self-observation's popularity among subjects 
(Schoeneman 1981) may be due to "approval" based on the 
norm of internality.
It may well be that subject's reports of the sources 
of self-knowledge are a function of biased self-perceptions. 
Schoeneman (1981) reports that when asked to respond under 
differing instructional sets, reports are similar under the 
"truthful" and "best light" conditions and "worst light" and 
"other student" conditions. Although his data do not 
address the direction of the relationship, they do suggest 
self-presentational implications. A different set of 
studies by Schoeneman (1981) suggests that overt forms of 
impression management may not be operating here since cor­
relations with the social desirability scale were generally 
weak or nonsignificant.
Statement of the Problem
The present study seeks to investigate and interpret 
subjects' reports of the sources of self-knowledge in light 
of the information presented about self-projection and the 
tools of social judgment. The basic tenet of this study is 
that subjects' reports are based on an implicit evaluation 
bias similar to Schlenkers' (1980) "self-projection" 
•hypothesis and Jellison and Green's (1981) "norm of inter­
nality." It is predicted that people have intuitive notions 
about the sources of self-knowledge. These notions are
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expected to be. very general and diffuse resulting in the 
overall effect that self-observation is seen as a better 
source than comparison and self-observers are perceived as 
better people than comparers. Such a hypothesis is very 
similar to Jellison and Green's (1981) where internal 
attributors received more social approval than did external 
attributors.
Although there is no evidence to date that, any of the 
sources of self-knowledge are organized schematically, it 
seems plausible that they may be organized in schematic- 
like fashion. For example, people may have an intuitive 
notion and evaluation of the process of self-observation 
(script) and of self-observers (schemas). This is, in many 
ways, just a restatement of Schoeneman's (1981) hypothesis 
that self-observation may be associated with independence 
and with individualism. Indeed, his ideas suggest that at 
the very least sources may be "representative" of different 
traits and dispositions carrying evaluation connotations.
The question of whether or not the sources are organized 
"schematically" or are merely ''representative” of traits is 
irrelevant at this point.. Similar predictions of source 
associations with evaluative concepts can be made with 
either of these tools of social judgment. Perhaps it might 
be best to consider this association an illusory correlation 
(an area it may be recalled in which heuristic and schematic 
use is also indistinguishable) between the various sources 
and a good-bad evaluative dimension. This would be an
illusory correlation since there is no reason to believe 
that sources like self-observation actually are used by 
more independent, individualistic persons or that social 
comparison is used by persons who are uncertain or have 
other unfavorable characteristics.
The data reported in Schoeneman's "imagined conditions" 
study (1981) would seem to support an illusory correlation 
hypothesis. Recall that self-observation was favored in 
the "best light" and "truthful and honest" conditions while 
comparison was favored in the "worst light" and "as others
y
w’ould" conditions. This clearly indicates a relationship 
in which self-observation is seen as "good" while social 
comparison is seen as "bad." Indeed, it may be that 
Schoeneman's (1981) results are a function of students 
responding based on stereotypes or "schemas" representative 
of the sources.
One issue which Schoeneman's (1981) study raises is why 
feedback remains constant throughout the instructional 
changes. To address this issue, several characteristics of 
feedback are important. Self-observation and social compari­
son both require intentionally initiated efforts from the 
self-perceiver and tell us that he or she wants to learn 
something. In contrast feedback does not always require 
this effort, or motivation to learn because this source 
actually involves two subtypes: solicited and unsolicited 
feedback. These two types were not separated in Schoeneman's 
early work, but it may be important to separate them in the
present study because this dimension will tell us something 
about the person's motivation to learn. In other words, 
subjective effort may be important since it tells subjects 
that someone wants to know something about him or herself. 
The manner in which learning is attempted may then be 
reflective on the person. Users of self-observation seem 
more self-reliant, and perhaps more internal in Jellison 
and Green's (1981) approach. In contrast users of solicited 
feedback or comparison seem less self-reliant or even 
uncertain, and more external in Jellison and Green's terms. 
Subjects' perceptions of Unsolicited feedback are harder 
to predict. It may be that without subjective effort to 
give the learned information more personal relevance, it 
would be viewed in a neutral manner; i.e., the person did 
not want or need to know so it does not matter anyway. 
However, it seems more likely that to a person receiving 
feedback without soliciting it the social situation will 
seem relatively out of control. Perhaps information learned 
via unsolicited feedback may appear to be either a compli- 
ment or an insult depending on what is learned.
The present study investigated the schema availability 
hypotheses by, in essence, reversing the paradigm used in 
earlier studies (Schoeneman 1981; Schoeneman, Tabor & Nash 
Note 2; Nash & Schoeneman Note 1). Instead of having sub­
jects generate frequencies of the sources or indicate which 
source best fits with instructional sets, the experimental 
task was to rate descriptions of people who learn about
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themselves via the different sources. This was accomplished 
by giving subjects four short stories consisting of a brief 
action paragraph followed by a source of self-knowledge 
ending in which one of the characters learns something about 
him or herself via a given source. This paradigm allowed 
differentiation of the sources of self-knowledge based on 
ratings such as good-bad, active-passive and the like. 
Although subjects were asked to rate the self-learner, it 
is assumed that they were actually rating a stereotyped 
impression of the self-learner which will be congruent with 
their individual source of self-knowledge schemas. This 
paradigm allowed testing of predictions made based on the 
"intuitive" properties of the sources.
Self-observation was expected to be rated as generally 
the best source. This rating is predicted to be quite 
diffuse and is expected to result in higher ratings on such 
unrelated dimensions as "have for a friend" or "similar" or 
"admirable.” Social comparison is expected to be at the 
opposite end of the evaluative spectrum and overall to cast 
a negative light upon its users. Solicited feedback is 
expected to fall in the middle range between self-observa­
tion and social, comparison. Depending on the valence of 
what is learned with unsolicited feedback it may appear to 
be either a compliment or an insult to the recipient. If 
this is the case, then the resulting ratings may be more 
extreme than either self-observation or social comparison.
A fifth, condition with no source, of self-knowledge ending,
.in which the character learns nothing, was also included as 
as control condition allowing an examination of subjects' 
impressions of the first part of the story. This condition 
is predicted to be a neutral one and as such to not produce 
extreme ratings.
In this study several other dimensions were also exam­
ined: the effects of the story character's sex, subject
sex, learning positive or negative traits and an examination 
of relationships between responses and some personality 
measures.
The variable of story character and subject sex is 
important to the study of the sources of self-knowledge 
since earlier studies (Schoeneman 1981, Nash & Schoeneman 
Note 1) suggest a sex difference for reports of social com­
parison. These studies, which used the'same methodological 
design, both found a tendency for males to report using 
comparison approximately twice as often as females. Thus, 
it may be that males find this source more acceptable, in 
which case in the present study male subjects may rate 
comparison ''better” than do female subjects. It was also 
of interest to see if male subjects would rate it as being 
more acceptable only for male story characters or for both 
sexes of characters. Indeed, it was possible to see if 
either, or both, male or female subjects report any rela­
tionship between their sex, story character sex and sources 
in general.
Similarly, the effects of trait valence were explored
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by presenting stories containing negative and positive 
triats. One would expect that, in general, positive traits 
would produce more positive ratings. This variable also 
.could reveal whether or not any sources were viewed differ­
ently when negative traits are learned. It is expected that 
private source ratings, such as those of self-observation 
and comparison may be less affected by negative traits than 
ratings of public sources like feedback. Results from this 
study also allowed for an examination for any effects 
between trait, subject sex arid character sex.
Subjects in the experimental conditions, those with a 
source of self-knowledge ending, were also given a chance to 
rate the actual source of self-knowledge for its accuracy, 
believability and reliability. These variables were 
included as exploratory measures; however some limited pre­
dictions can be made. The norm of internality (Jellison & 
Green 1981) suggests that private internal sources such as 
self-observation would be rated better than public external 
sources like feedback and social comparison. Indeed, feed­
back and comparison's predicted "negative schematic" 
organization may be strong enough to bias subjects' 
perceptions of these sources. The ratings of the source, 
like the ratings of the self-learner, were expected to be
i
global and it is likely that all three variables will be 
seen as implicitly going together.
A final aspect of this study looked for any relation­
ships between personality traits and subjects' reports of
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the sources of self-knowledge. The traits studied were: 
self-consciousness (Feningstein, Scheier & Buss 1975), self- 
monitoring (Snyder 1974), social desirability (Crowne & 
Marlowe 1964), and both trait and state anxiety (Spielberger, 
Gorsuch & Lushene 1968).
The self-consciousness scale (Feninstpin et al. 1975) 
was designed to assess individual differences in three 
aspects of self-consciousness: private s^lf-consciousness, 
public self-consciousness and social anxiety. The concepts 
of private and public self-consciousness are traits analogous 
to the states of private and public self-awareness discussed’ 
earlier in relation to Nash and Schoeneman's work (Note 1). 
Thus, private self-consciousness represents a tendency to 
spend more time attending to internal thoughts and feelings, 
i.e., "I think about so and so a lot.” ' Public self- 
consciousness is a tendency to focus attention on how one 
is presented and how this effects others, J  .e ., ”1 think a 
lot about how others see me.” The third measure on this 
scale is social anxiety. This was defined as a measure of 
discomfort in social situations, i.e., ”1 get nervous at 
large parties.”
Snyder's self-monitoring scale is a self-report instru­
ment designed to assess individual differences in the 
ability to "observe and control expressive behavior and 
self-presentation” (1974, p. 536). According to this scale 
a high self-monitorer would be someone aware of how 
appropriate his or her self-presentation is in a given
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setting and would be likely to change his or her behavior 
to manipulate others' reactions. This can be contrasted 
with the low self-monitoring person who has very little con­
cern for his or her self-presentation or the expressions of 
others. This individual would be more likely to govern 
behavior as a function of internal attitudes and not social 
reactions or pressure.
The state-trait anxiety inventory (Spielberger et al. 
1968) is a self-report measure consisting of two scales.
The state anxiety scale asks subjects to report how they 
feel "at this moment." It assesses "a transient emotional 
state or condition of the human organism that is character­
ized by subjective consciously perceived feelings of tension 
and apprehension" (Spielberger et al. 1968, p. 3). By way 
of contrast, the trait measure asks for a report of how 
subjects generally feel.
The last scale included in this study is the Marlowe- 
Crowne Social Desirability scale (Crowne & Marlowe 1964). 
This scale measures the degree to which a person agrees to 
statements which are "'good' culturally sanctioned things to 
say about oneself: and second, they are probably unture of 
most people" (Crowne 4 Marlowe 1964, p. 21). This scale is 
of particular interest since it i^ as included in Schoeneman's 
(1981) original study. He found modest, yet significant, 
correlations between this scale and percent mentions of 
social comparison and mean rankings of feedback. Thus it 
was of interest to attempt to replicate these results and to
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explore fc~ any relationship between social desirability and 
the measures in the current study.
In summary, the hypotheses tested in this study were: 
that subjects' reports of the sourees of self-knowledge are 
a function of an implicit good-bad evaluation of the sources 
and a replication of the ranking portion of Schoeneman's 
study (1981) . Also included in this study were an explora­
tion of other independent variables (i.e., subject sex, 
character sex, and trait valance) as well as the relation­
ships between several traits (i.e., anxiety, self- 
consciousness, self-monitoring and social desirability) and 
the reports of the sources of self-knowledge.
CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY 
Subj ects
Subjects for this study were recruited from the 
University of North Dakota's Introductory and Developmental 
Psychology subject pool. A total of 200 subjects, 100 male 
and 100 female, was tested in groups of fewer than 30.
Test materials were distributed so that all experimental 
conditions were as equally represented as possible during 
each session.
Procedure
Subjects were told they were participating in a "story 
rating study" and were asked to read four stories and 
complete several questions and ratings about each story.
Each subject was given two packets of experimental materials.
The first packet contained four different stories each 
constructed in the same format, an introductory "action” 
paragraph consisting of 2 same sex friends either having a 
pizza, going fishing, watching TV or walking back from 
class, and a source of self-knowledge ending paragraph (see 
Appendix A for the experimental stories). These stories had 
been studied in an earlier investigation to determine if the
— -  ------------
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format of the stories plus a source of self-knowledge ending 
produced a character rating effect and also allowed examina­
tion of subjects’ impressions of the stories. Based on the 
pilot data,'which is not included in the present report, it 
was found that the different source of self-knowledge 
endings did influence the character ratings.
Each packet of four stories always had the same type of 
ending; i.e., four self-observation, unsolicited feedback, 
solicited feedback, social comparison or no source endings. 
Thus, source of self-knowledge was a between subjects condi­
tion. Each set of four stories also contained two stories 
with male characters, two with female characters, two with 
’'positive" traits and two with "negative" traits.
Positive and negative trait words were taken from a 
subset of 200 high meaningfulness words from Anderson's 
(1968) table of likableness ratings of 555 words. Positive 
or negative was somewhat arbitrarily defined as being within 
a ± .AO to -60 Z score range. The positive traits, with Z 
scores in parentheses were "serious" (+ 0.56) and "idealis­
tic" (+ 0.59), negative traits were "timid" (-0.42) and 
"sarcastic" (-0.50). Because the traits were matched on 
likableness ratings, it was possible to assume, for example, 
that the two positive traits were conceptually equal. The 
same assumption also holds for the negative traits allowing 
"timid” and "sarcastic" to both be seen as producing 
equivalent results.
Trait and story character sex were counterbalanced so
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Chat each story stem appears with equal frequency with each 
character sex and trait (see Table 2). Additionally, presen 
tation order was counterbalanced so each story was equally 
represented in each serial order.
The second packet contained the following scales, Self- 
Monitoring (Snyder 1974) , State-Trait Anxiety (Spielberger 
et al. 1968), Self-Consciousness scale (Fenigstein, Scheier 
& Buss 1975) and Social Desirability (Crowne & Marlowe 
1964).
Thus, the procedure for each subject was as follows:
1) Instructions were given to the subjects to first 
complete the packet containing • the stories and then to 
complete the set of questionnaires. Specific instructions 
were given only to explain to subjects how to place an 
identification number on some sheets and to remind them of 
confidentiality policies. Subjects were then reminded to 
begin with the packet containing the stories which were 
described as a set of short stories followed by some 
questions and ratings. They were instructed to read each 
story carefully and not to turn back to them while answering 
test items.
2) Read the first story.
3) Complete a manipulation check to determine that 
subjects had read and understood the story. This check' 
consisted of five questions for subjects in the self- 
observation, solicited and unsolicited feedback and social 
comparison conditions and the first two questions for those
TABLE 2
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PRESENTATION ORDER OF STORIES
• ■ • • •' ’
Experimental
Condition*
Character Sex
Male Female
+ Trait 
(Idealistic)
- Trait 
(Sarcastic)
+ Trait 
(Serious)
- Trait 
(Timid)
1** 2 3 4
Self- 2 3 4 1
Observation 3 4 1 2
4 1 2 3
1
Unsolicited 2
Feedback 3
4
1
Solicited 2
Feedback 3
: 4
1
Social 2
Comparison 3
4
1
No 2
Source 3
4
*Experimental Condition is a between subjects variable, 
all others are within subjects variables.
**Numbers 1-4 represent the story sterns used in each 
condition. The 'same pattern was used in all between subject 
conditions.
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in the no source ending condition. The questions used were:
1) What activity were the people in this story doing?,
2) Did someone learn something about him/herself in this 
story?, 3) Who learned something about him/herself in this 
story?, 4) What did he/she learn about him/herself?, 5) How 
did he/she learn it? All subjects were able to correctly 
complete these questions, thus no subjects' data was 
excluded from analysis.
4) Subjects rated the character who learned something 
(the character's name was provided in the'no source condi­
tion) on the following dimensions: good, optimistic, 
strong, dominant, active, dynamic, admirable, friendly, 
likable, nice, popular, similar, enjoy the person's company, 
have for a friend, desire to look good, curious, emotionally 
healthy, intelligent, has control over own life (see Table
3) . Subjects then rated the sources of self knowledge used 
(those questions were not given in the no source condition) 
for its accuracy, believability and reliability (see Table
4) .
5) Subjects went through steps 2 to 4 for each of the 
remaining 3 stories.
6) Subjects completed a series of 10 ranking proce­
dures developed by Schoeneman (1981) using the format:
I have come to know I am a(n)__________person through
_.__ _ comparing my .actions and opinions with those of
other people
______ noticing the direct and indirect feedback that
TABLE 3
RATING DIMENSIONS FOR STORY CHARACTERS
1) good-bad*
2) optimistic-pessimistic*
3) strong-weak**
A) dominant-submissive**
5) active-passive***
6) dynamic-static***
7) admirable-not. admirable
8) friendly-unfriendly
9) likable-uniikable
10) nice-mean
11) popular-unpopular
12) similar-dissimilar
13) enjoy the person's company--not enjoy the person's 
company
14) have for a friend--not have for a friend
15) desires to look good-~does not desire to look good
16) curious--not curious
17) emotionally healthy--emotionally unhealthy
18) intelligent--unintelligent
19) has control over own life--does not/others control own 
life
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*Iteras making up the evaluative scale of the semantic 
differential.
**Iterns making up the potency scale of the semantic 
differential.
***Iterns making up the activity scale of the semantic 
differential.Note items 1-6 taken from Friedman and Gladden (196A) 
and items 7-14 modified from Jellison and Green (1981) .
others give to me and their reactions to 
me
______ observing my own actions, thoughts and feelings
and the situations in which they occur.
Each choice was randomly rotated in position across the 10 
items. The rankings used on them were 1 = most important,
2 = second in importance, 3 ~ third in importance, and N = 
not applicable, irrelevant, etc. The traits used in the 
ranking portion were: easy going, quiet, sarcastic, timid, 
versatile, serious, forgetful, mature, friendly, and 
idealistic.
7) Subjects completed the following questionnaires: 
Self-Consciousness Scale, State-Trait Anxiety Scale, Self- 
Monitoring Scale and Social Desirability Scale.
TABLE 4 .
RATING DIMENSIONS FOR THE SOURCES OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE*
1. accurate-inaccurate
2 . believable-unbelievable
3. reliable-unreliable
*These ratings were not given to subjects in the "no 
source of self-knowledge" ending condition.
Dependent Variables
The variables listed in Tables 3 and 4 were all rated 
on 1 to 10 scales. Thus, dependent variables were simply 
the number assigned to each by the subject. Item pairs
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comprising the semantic differential (Friedman & Gladden 
1964) were averaged for the evaluative-, potency and activity 
ratings. These dependent variables were each analysed 
separately using a 4 factor ANOVA design, i.e., "trait 
valence" by "character sex" by "subject sex" by "source of 
self-knowledge condition."
The dependent variables from Schoeneman's (1981) rank­
ing procedure are simply mean rankings for each source. The 
number of "N" responses was summed as a separate variable.
As part of this ranking procedure the four traits used 
in the experimental stories were included. Thus mean rank­
ings and sum of N responses were calculated for i) all 10 
traits, ii) the 4 experimental traits, iii) the 6 non- 
experimental traits. The ANOVA procedure used in this 
analysis was a 3 factor design; "source of self-knowledge 
condition" by "subject sex" by "number of traits" (4 ti'ait 
group vs. 6 trait group). A separate ANOVA was computed 
for each of the following 6 variables: mean rank of self­
observation, feedback, and social comparison and the number 
of times "not applicable" was used for self-observation, 
feedback and social comparison.
CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
The results of this study are composed of three kinds 
of measures.- (1) the ratings of the self-learner and (in 
all but the no source ending condition) the source he or■ A '
she used, (2) a set of ranking variables analogous to those 
used by Schoeneman (1981) arid Nash and Schoeneman (Note 1) , 
and (3) analysis of the above variables in light of several 
personality trait and response set measures. Each of these 
groups was analyzed in a similar manner. A repeated 
measures analysis of variance 'was computed for each depend­
ent variable with, the traditional alpha level of .05 used 
as the criterion for statistical significance. The Newman- 
Keuls procedure was used on all significant main effects 
and interactions to determine which group means were 
different.
Story Character and 
Source Ratings
The analysis of mrimary importance to this study in­
volved the story character and source of self-knowledge 
rating variables. As Table 5 clearly demonstrates, these 
variables produced a large number of significant main 
effects and interactions'. In presenting these results each
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..— __________________________
TABLE 5
F VALUES FOR SIGNIFICANT CHARACTER AND SOURCE RATINGS
Significant Effects3
Dependent
Variable
Source
Condition
Trait
Valence
Character
Sex
Subject
Sex
Trait 
Valence 
by Source 
Condition
Trait
Valence by 
Character 
Sex
Character Trait 
Sex by Valence by 
Subject Sex Character 
by Source Sex by 
Condition Subject Sex
Trait
Valence by 
Character 
Sex by 
Source 
Condition
Accurate 5.09
Believable 5.09
Reliable 6.44*
Similar 4.64* 11.47*
Enjoy the
Person’s
Company 3.26 6.91 5.31
Admirable 2.49 37.46** 2.66
Emotionally
Healthy 2.63 39.39** 2.74
Desires to
Look Good 10.78* 3.15*
Friendly 11.86* 9.71*
Likable 11.46* 6.66* 4.91 8.12*
Nice 10.35* 5.69* 24.55**
Have for a
Friend 13.01* 9.65* 7.09*
Evaluative
Scale 18.70** 9.04 5.14*
Activity
Scale 5.79* 71.63** 49.34** 10.09** 39.93** 3.63* 2.53
Potency
Scale 5.17* 87.76** 87.76** 7.10** 35.19** 6.4o**
Curious 8.45* • 4.58* 2.56
Controls
Own Life 10.46** 57.41** 3.32* 11.92* 2.47
Intelligent 15.43** 17.18* 2.70
Popular 2.52 16.61** * 3.79
aNote all listed F values significant at .05 level.
*p < .01.
**p < .0001.
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variable is discussed individually to allow an examination 
and integration of each variable's significant effects. As 
much as possible the individual variables are grouped with 
other variables that produced similar levels of effects, 
i.e., main effects, second or third order interactions. 
Following this presentation is an attempt to summarize and 
reiterate the main conclusions from these results.
Results from the sources of self-knowledge ratings 
indicate that all sources are more "accurate" (F [1,. 148] = 
5.09, p < .0255), "believable" (F [1, 148] =3.07, p < 
.0255) and "reliable" (F Cl, 148] = 6.44, p < .0122) when 
positive as opposed to. negative traits are learned (see 
Table 6). '
TABLE 6
TRAIT VALENCE RATINGS FOR ACCURATE, BELIEVABLE AND RELIABLE
Variable Name
Trait
Valence Accurate Believable Reliable
Positive 4.9 4 a 4.55 5.48
Negative 5.42 4.91 5.84
‘'Lower means are more "accurate" etc.
Analysis of the variable "similar" also indicates a 
significant main effect for trait valence (F [1, 186] = 
11.47, p < .0009) in which the use of positive traits
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results in a rating of greater "similarity." A significant 
main effect was also found in the source of self-knowledge 
condition (F [1, 186] - 4.64, p < .0014). Newman Keuls’ 
post-hoc analysis indicates that the no source of self- 
knowledge ending condition resulted in a rating of greater 
"similarity" than did the unsolicited feedback condition; 
i.e., the two source conditions at either end of a continuum 
(see Table 7).
TABLE 7
TRAIT VALENCE BY SOURCE OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE CONDITION 
MEANS FOR RATINGS OF SIMILAR
Condition Name
Trait
Valence
Self-
Observa tion
Unsolicited
Feedback
Solicited
Feedback
Social
com­
parison
No
Ending
Positive 4.23a . 4.93 4.63 4.69 3.86
Negative 4.79 5.38 4.71 4.83 4.29
aLower means are more "similar."
Results from the variable "enjoy the person's company" 
also produced a significant main effect for trait valence 
(F [1, 185] - 6.91, p < .0093), subject sex (F [1, 185] - 
3.31, p < .0224), and the source of self-knowledge condition 
(F [1, 185] - 3.26, p < ,0131). The trait valence effect 
showed that positive traits produce a rating of greater 
"enjoyment of the person's company" than did negative
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traits. Post hoc analyses of the source of self-knowledge 
effects show that characters using self-observation and 
social comparison are more ’’enjoyable" than those using 
unsolicited feedback (see Table 8). Subject sex analysis 
show female subjects rate characters more "enjoyable" than 
did male subjects (3.55 vs. 4.01).
TABLE 8
TRAIT VALENCE BY SOURCE OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE CONDITION 
MEANS FOR RATINGS OF ENJOY THE PERSON'S COMPANY
Condition Name
Trait
Valence
SeLf-
Observation
Unsolicited
Feedback
Solicited
Feedback
Social
com­
parison
No
Ending
Positive 3.54a 3.82 3.75 4.08 3.13
Negative 3.90 4.25 4.13 4.20 3.18
nLower means are more "enjoyable.”
The variable "admirable" produced significant effects 
for trait valence (F [1, 186] = 37/46, p < .0001), source of 
self-knowledge condition (F [1, 186] = 2.49, p < .0449) and 
the interaction of trait valence by source of self-knowledge 
condition (F [I, 186] = 2.66, p < .0340) (see Table 9). 
Post-hoc analysis of: the interaction indicates that for 
groups using positive traits, self-observation was rated as 
more "admirable" than all other sources while negative 
traits indicated the following: The no ending condition was
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more "admirable" than unsolicited feedback and social com­
parison; self-observation and solicited feedback were more 
"admirable" than social comparison. Post-hoc analysis also 
indicated that self-observation, unsolicited feedback and 
social comparison showed a trait valence effect, i.e., 
positive trait, use was more "admirable,” while solicited 
feedback and the no ending group were not affected by the 
trait valence dimension.
TABLE 9
• '' ' • ■ • < .
TRAIT VALENCE BY SOURCE OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE CONDITION 
MEANS FOR RATINGS OF ADMIRABLE
Condition Name
Social
Trait
Valence
Self-
Observation
Unsolicited
Feedback
Solicited
Feedback
com­
parison
No
Ending
Positive 3.59a A.30 A. A5 A. 37 A.1A
Negative A. 70 5.10 A.77 5.38 A. 31
cl »Lower means are more "admirable."
The variable "emotionally healthy" produced significant 
effects for trait valence (F [1, 186] ~ 39.39, p < .0001), 
source of self-knowledge ending condition (F [1, 186] ~
2.63, p < .0358) and trait valence by source of self- 
knowledge condition (F [1, 186] = 2.7A, p < .0299) (see 
Table 10). Post-hoc examination of the two-way interaction 
revealed that only the no ending condition did not produce
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a trait valence effect. Thus, the finding that with nega­
tive traits the no ending group is more healthy than all 
other sources reflects the negative impact of trait valence 
on the self-observation, social comparison and both feedback 
conditions in contrast to the lack of such an effect on the 
no ending group. No groups of source of self-knowledge con­
dition means were significantly different with the set using 
positive traits.
TABLE 10
TRAIT VALENCE BY SOURCE OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE CONDITION MEANS 
FOR RATINGS OF EMOTIONALLY HEALTHY '
Condition Name
v Social
Trait
Valence
Self-
Observation
Unsolicited
Feedback
Solicited
Feedback
com­
parison
No
Ending
Positive 3.56a 4.01 3.70 3.76 3.44
Negative 4.39 4.74 4.55 4.48 3.43
£3, * ^‘'Lower means are more ’’emotionally healthy."
The variable "desires to look good" produced a charac­
ter sex main effect in which female story characters ‘were 
rated as "desiring to look good" more than the males (F [1, 
185] - 10.78, p < .0012; female mean = 3.77, male mean = 
4.28). The interaction of trait valence and source of self- 
knowledge condition was also significant (F [1, 185] ~ 3.15, 
p < .0155) (see Table 11). Post-hoc analysis indicates that
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with positive traits self-observation and social comparison 
are "desiring to look better” than the no ending condition 
while with negative traits self-observation is seen as 
"desiring to look better" than unsolicited feedback. Com­
parison of positive vs. negative groups shows that positive 
traits produce the best ratings for unsolicited feedback and 
social comparison, negative traits produce the best ratings 
for the no ending group while self-observation and solicited 
feedback are unaffected by trait valence.
TABLE 11
TRAIT VALENCE BY SOURCE OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE CONDITION MEANS 
FOR RATINGS OF DESIRES TO LOOK GOOD
Condition Name
Social
Trait
Valence
Self-
Observation
Unsolicited
Feedback
Solicited
Feedback
com­
parison
No
Ending
Positive 3.65a A. 12 A. 15 3.81 A.59
Negative 3.83 A. 59 A. 23 A .-AA A.03
aLower means are "desiring to look better."
Analysis of "friendly" produced a main effect for trait, 
valence (F [1, 185] = 11.86, p < .0007) and an interaction 
of trait valence by character sex (F [1, 185] = 9.71, p < 
.0021) (see Table 12). Post-hoc interpretation of this 
interaction suggests that the negative trait, male characters 
are responsible for both effects; these characters are rated
less friendly than all other character sex and trait c o m b i ­
nations .
TABLE 12
TRAIT VALENCE BY CHARACTER SEX MEANS FOR 
RATINGS OF FRIENDLY
Character Sex
Trait
Valence. Male Female
Positive 3.32a 3.45
Negative 4.00 3.48
aLower means are more "friendly."
A similar set of results was found for the variable 
"likable" with significant effects for trait valence (F [1, 
185] = 11.46, p < .0009), character sex (F [1, 185] - 6.66, 
p < .0106) and trait valence by character sex (F [1, 185] = 
8.12, p < .004,9). Once again male characters learning nega­
tive traits were rated the least well, less "likable” in 
this case, than all other trait and sex combinations (see 
Table 13). A subject sex rating difference was also found 
for the variable "likable" such that females reported all 
characters more likable than did the male subjects (2.34 
vs. 3.76, F [1, 185 3 = 4.91, p < . 0279).
With the variable "nice, male characters learning 
negative traits once again suffer, being noted the least 
"nice" of all other combinations of trait valence and
character sex (F [1, 186] = 24.55, p < .0001). Note also 
that the ’’negative male" group seems to be responsible for 
the significant trait valence main effect (F [1, 186] ~ 
10.35, p < .0015) (see Table 14). Subject sex was also 
significant for this variable indicating female subjects 
rate all story characters as "nicer" than did male subjects 
(3.28 vs. 3.70, F [1, 186] - 5.69, p < .0180) .
TABLE 13
TRAIT VALENCE BY CHARACTER SEX MEANS FOR RATINGS OF LIKABLE
Character Sex
Trait Valence Male Female
Positive 3.38a 3.43
Negative 4.04 3.45
aLower means are more "likable.”
TABLE 14' . : ' ..."
T R A I T  V A L E N C E  B Y  C H A R A C T E P v S E X  M E A N S  F O R  R A T I N G S  O F  N I C E
Character Sex
Trait Valence - Male Female
Positive 3.35a 3.39
Negative 4.11 3.20
aLower means are "nicer."
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With results showing male characters learning negative 
traits are rated the least "friendly,'’ "likable” and "nice," 
it will come as little surprise that they are also rated the 
lowest on the variable "have for a friend" in the trait 
valence by character sex interaction (F [1, 184] = 7.09, 
p < .0084) and seem to have been responsible for the main 
effects of trait valence (F [1, 184] = 13.01, p < .0004) and 
character sex (F [1, 184] = 9,65, p < .0022) (see Table 15). 
A nonsignificant trend was also found for women subjects to 
rate characters as more the type of person to "have for a 
friend" than male subjects (3.74 vs. 3.99, F [1, 184] *
2.96, p < .0872).
TABLE 15
TRAIT VALENCE BY CHARACTER SEX MEANS FOR 
RATINGS OF HAVE FOR.A FRIEND
Character Sex
Trait Valence Male Female
Positive 3.67a 3.64
Negative 4.39 3.73
Lower means are more the type of person to "have for a 
friend."
On the "evaluative" scale of the semantic differential 
significant trait valence (F [1, 185] = 18.70, p < .0001), 
character sex (F [1, 185] = 9.04, p < .0030) and trait 
valence by character sex by subject sex (F [1, 185] ~ 5.14,
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p < .0245) effects were found (see Figure 1). Analysis of 
the interaction using the Newman Keuls procedure shows that 
with positive traits female subjects rate female characters 
as "better" than male characters and also that female sub­
jects rate them "better" than do male subjects. With 
negative traits, however, subjects rate characters of the 
same sex as "worse" than opposite sex characters. Female 
subjects also rate male characters as being "better" than do 
male subjects.
FIGURE 1
TRAIT VALENCE BY CHARACTER SEX BY SUBJECT 
SEX FOR EVALUATIVE RATINGS
4.5
4.0
3.5
3.0
Subject Sex 
Ti*ait Valence P N
The.following abbreviations were used: 
p - positive trait valence, N = negative 
trait valence, M = males, F = females.
"Lower ratings are "better."
The "activity" scale of the semantic differential pro­
duced the largest number of significant main effects and 
interactions: Source of self-knowledge condition (F [1,
186] = 5.79, p < .0002), trait valence (F [1, 186] = 71.63. 
p < .0001), character sex (F [I, 186] = 49.34, p < .0001),
’ .7/,
trait valence by source condition (F [1, 186] = 10.09, p < 
.0001), trait valence by character sex (F [1, 186] - 39.93, 
p < .0001), character sex by subject sex by source condition 
(F f1, 186] = 3.63, p < .0071) and trait valence by charac­
ter sex by source condition (F [1, 186] = 2.53, p < .0421).
Post-hoc analysis of character sex by subject sex by source
. • ' • ■ ■ • ■ • , .
. • • •. . ' . . . . .
of self-knowledge condition (see Figure 2) reveals that male 
subjects rate female characters more "active" in the no 
ending condition than in social comparison or either feed­
back condition and they rate male characters more active in 
the no ending and self-observation conditions than in the
FIGURE 2
CHARACTER SEX BY SUBJECT SEX BY SOURCE OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE 
CONDITION MEANS FOR RATINGS OF ACTIVITY
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Char. Sex 
Source Gond SO UFB SFB SO NO
The following abbreviations were used: M = males, F = 
females, SO = self-observation, UFB - unsolicited feedback, 
SFB = solicited feedback, SC - social comparison, NO = no 
ending.
"Lower ratings are more "active."
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unsolicited feedback condition. Female subjects rate female 
characters more active in the self-observation and the no 
ending condition than in the social comparison or either 
feedback condition and the no ending, self-observation, 
social comparison and unsolicited feedback conditions more 
active than the solicited feedback condition. Thus it 
appears that self-observation and. rather surprisingly, the 
no ending condition are the most "active" modes of self- 
validation- for same sexed characters.
Analysis of trait valence, by character sex by source 
of self-knowledge suggest several sets of conclusions (see 
Figure 3). First of all it may be noted that trait valence 
has more impact on female characters; only in the no ending 
group did this dimension fail to reach significance. In 
contrast'trait valence, reached significance only once for 
male characters, in the social comparison condition. Dif­
ferent combinations of trait valence and character sex 
reveal somewhat different ranking, of. "activity" for the 
different sources. For female characters using positive 
traits self-observation and social comparison are more 
active than the no ending or either feedback condition. A 
similar pattern was found for males learning positive 
traits; self-observation and social comparison are more 
"active" than either feedback group. With negative traits 
females are the most "active" in the no ending condition 
and more "active" in self-observation and unsolicited feed- 
back than in the social comparison condition. Once again
the results for males approximate those for females, the no 
ending condition is more "active" than social comparison or 
either feedback condition and self-observation is more 
"active" than solicited feedback or social comparison.
FIGURE 3
TRAIT VALENCE BY CHARACTER SEX BY SOURCE OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE 
CONDITION MEANS FOR RATINGS OF ACTIVITY
Trait Valence P N P N ? N P N P N
Source Condition SO UFB SFB SC NO
The following abbreviations were used: P = positive 
trait valence, N = negative trait valence, SO - self- 
observation, UFB = unsolicited feedback, SFB = solicited 
feedback, SC = social comparison, NO = no ending, M = males, 
F - females...
Lower ratings are more "active."
The "potency" scale of the semantic differential also 
produced several significant effects; source of self- 
knowledge condition (F [1, 185] - 5.17, p < .0006), trait 
valence (F [I, 185] = 87.76, p < .0001), character sex (F
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[1, 186] = 28.77, p < .0001), trait valence by character sex 
(F [1, 185] = 35.19, p < .0001), trait valence by source 
condition (F [1, 185] =7.10, p < .0001) and trait valence 
by character sex by source condition (F [1, 185] =6.40, 
p < .0001) (see Figure 4).
FIGURE 4 •
TRAIT VALENCE. BY CHARACTER SEX BY SOURCE OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE 
CONDITION MEANS FOR RATINGS OF POTENCY
7.
7.
6 .
6 .
5.
5.
4,
4.
3.
Trait Valence P N P N P N P N P N
Source Condition SO UFB SFB SC NO
The following abbreviations were used: P = positive 
trait valence, N = negative trait valence, SO = seif- 
observation, UFB = unsolicited feedback, SFB = solicited 
feedback, SC = social comparison, NO = no ending, M = males, 
F = females.
Lower means are more "potent. '
Post hoc analysis at the highest level of intex*action 
indicates the effects of character sex and trait valence are 
due to the extremely poor "potency" rating given to females
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learning negative traits, this is especially pronounced ir. 
the social comparison and the no ending groups. Other 
analyses showed that males learning positive traits in the 
self-observation condition are more potent than those in the 
solicited feedback condition. A very different set of dif­
ferences was found when negative traits are learned; females 
in the no ending and solicited feedback conditions are more 
"potent" than those in the social comparison group while no 
groups are significantly different for male characters.
There was also a non-significant trend for self-observation 
to be the most potent source of self-knowledge, including 
the no ending group, for males learning positive and nega­
tive traits and females learning positive traits.
Significant effects for the variable "curious" were 
found for trait valence (F [i, 185] = 8.45, p < .0041), 
trait valence by character sex (F f1, 185] = 4.58, p <
.0337) and trait valence by character sex by source of self- 
knowledge condition (F [1, 185] - 2.56, p < .0402) (see 
Figure 5). Analysis of the three-way interaction shows that 
trait valence has a significant effect on female characters 
in all but the no ending condition but is never significant 
for males. These female characters learning negative traits 
suffer the most in the self-observation and social compari­
son conditions, in which all other trait/sex combinations 
are more "curious," and in the unsolicited feedback condi­
tion in which positive trait learneis are more "curious."
In this unsolicited feedback condition males learning
'•• '. . • V;;-' ; • '
.(•  •• ' v:'1
v-■'
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FIGURE 5
TRAIT VALENCE BY CHARACTER SEX BY SOURCE OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE 
CONDITION MEANS FOR RATINGS OF CURIOUS
Trait Valence 
Source Condition SO UFB SFB SC NO
The following abbreviations were used: P = positive 
trait valence, N = negative trait valence, SO = self- 
observation, UFB = unsolicited feedback, SFB ~ solicited 
feedback, SC = social comparison, NO = no ending, M = males, 
F ~ females.
Lower means are more "curious.
negative traits are also less curious than positive female 
learner groups. Differences among the ratings of the dif­
ferent sources of self-knowledge are also noted between the 
different trait and sex groups. Female characters learning 
positive traits are more "curious" in the solicited feedback 
than the self-observation group while the male characters 
are more "curious" in the self-observation than unsolicited 
feedback. A character sex difference is also apparent when 
negative traits are learned; for females the no ending group 
is more "curious" than self-observation, unsolicited feed­
back and social comparison, solicited feedback is also more 
"curious” than social comparison. However, for male
characters unsolicited feedback is less curious than all 
four of the other ending conditions.
Another variable producing numerous significant effects 
was the rating variable "has control over own life." These 
effects are as follows: Source of self-knowledge condition 
(F Cl, 185] = 10.42, p <■ .0001), trait valence (F [1, 185] = 
57.41, p < .0001), trait valence by source condition (F [1, 
185] = 3.32, p < .0118), trait valence by character sex (F 
[1, 183] = 11.92, p < .0007) and trait valence by -character 
sex by source condition (F [1, 185] = 2.47, p < .0461). 
Conclusions regarding this variable from the post hoc tests, 
and as evident in Figure 6, suggest that trait valence had
FIGURE 6
TRAIT VALENCE BY CHARACTER SEX BY SOURCE OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE 
CONDITION MEANS FOR RATINGS OF "CONTROLS OWN LIFE"
Trait Valence
Source Condition SO UFB SFB SC NO
The following abbreviations were used: P = positive 
trait valence, N * negative trait valence, SO = self­
observation, UFB = unsolicited feedback, SFB = solicited 
feedback, SC = social comparison, NO = no ending, M = males, 
F - females.
aLower means are in more "control."
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an effect in all male character groups except the unsolic­
ited feedback group and all female groups except the no 
ending group. For positive-female characters the no ending 
group was in ’’more control” than both feedback groups and 
all groups were in "more control” than the unsolicited 
feedback group. A similar set of findings was noted for 
males learning positive traits; the no ending group is in 
more control than social comparison and both feedback 
groups, while self-observation is in more control than both 
feedback groups. For all characters learning negative 
traits the no ending group is in "more control” than all 
other groups. Additionally for the male group self­
observation is in "more control than unsolicited feedback.
Results for the variable "intelligent” produced three 
significant effects, trait valence (F [1, 185] - 18.A3, 
p < .0001), character sex (F [1, 185] = 17.18, p < .0001) 
and trait valence by character sex by source of self- 
knowledge condition (F [1, 185] = 2.70, p < .0328). Figure 
7 illustrates the post-hoc results showing trait valence 
has a significant effect for all characters in the self­
observation and social comparison conditions, for males in 
unsolicited feedback, and females in solicited feedback.
For characters using positive traits no source of self- 
knowledge condition means were significantly different.
When characters learned negative traits, the no ending con­
dition was rated the most "intelligent” of all groups plus,
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FIGURE 7
TRAIT VALENCE BY CHARACTER SEX BY SOURCE OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE 
CONDITION MEANS FOR RATINGS OF INTELLIGENT
for males, all groups were mo r e  "intelligent" than those in
the u n s o licited feedback group.
Source Condition SO UFB SFB SC NO
The following abbreviations were used: P - positive 
trait valence, N = negative"trait valence, SO = self- 
observation, UFB ~ unsolicited feedback, SFB =. solicited 
feedback, SC = social comparison, NO = no ending, M = males, 
F - females.
^ower means are more "intelligent.
The last story rating variable is "popular" which has 
the following significant results: Source of self- 
knowledge condition (F [1, 186] “ 2.52, p < .0425), trait 
valence (F [1, 186j =16.61, p < .001), and trait valence by 
character sex by sotirce of self-knowledge condition (F [1, 
186] = 3.79, p <■ .0053) (see Figure 8). Trait valence 
effects are present for both sexes in the self-observation 
and unsolicited feedback groups, for females using social 
comparison and for males in the no ending groups. Also it
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FIGURE 8
TRAIT VALENCE BY CHARACTER SEX BY SOURCE OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE
CONDITION MEANS FOR RATINGS OF POPULAR
Trait Valence
Source Condition SO UFB SFB SC NO
The following abbreviations were used; P ~ positive 
trait valence N = negative trait valence, SO = self- 
observation, UFB = unsolicited feedback, SFB = solicited 
feedback, SC - social comparison, NO = no ending, M ~ males, 
F ~ females.
aLower means are more "popular,”
may be noted that two non-significant trends may exist, for 
males learning negative traits to be more "popular" than 
males learning positive traits in the solicited feedback 
group and for females learning negative traits to be more 
"popular" in the no ending group than females learning 
positive traits. Across the different sources of self- 
knowledge, females learning positive traits and males learn­
ing negative traits produce no significant differences.
Males learning positive traits are more "popular" in the no 
ending group than social comparison and the feedback groups 
plus more popular in self-observation than social comparison.
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Females learning negative traits are more "popular” in the 
no ending group than in all others.
Summary
Having looked at the results of each dependent varia­
ble, the next task is to attempt to translate the above 
discussion of statistical significance to a format which 
will facilitate examination of global hypotheses such as 
"trait valence" and "source of self-knowledge condition" 
without losing the precision dictated by the frequent inter 
action of independent variables. Clearly, as Table 5 
showed, trait valence produced the most widespread and 
consistent result. However, it would be incorrect to simpl 
assume positive traits always produced lower, hence 
"better," mean ratings than negative traits. While such 
main effects were found for "similar," "accurate," "believa 
ble," "reliable" and "enjoy the person's company" the other 
variables produced various interactions. However when 
interactions with character sex are examined, it can be 
noted, in several instances, i.e., "potency," "activity," 
"admirable" and "emotionally healthy," the poor ratings of 
tiegative traits seemed due to the very poor ratings given 
female characters using negative traits while for 
"friendly," "likable," "nice," and "have for a friend" the 
poor ratings were due to the low ratings given male char­
acters using negative traits.
Trait valence also produced numerous interactions with
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source of self-knowledge condition. Examining these in­
stances where trait valence differences failed to occur 
reveals the most frequent condition as the no ending group, 
i.e., for "admirable"emotionally healthy," "popular," 
"intelligent," "curious"; for female characters "controls 
own life" and for males with "potent." Curiously the no end 
ing group also produced the only "reverse" finding in which 
negative traits caused characters to be seen as "desiring to 
look better" than positive traits. Other source of self- 
knowledge conditions and the variables x^ hich. did not produce 
significant results are listed below: 1) self-observation-- 
potent and curious (both for males only); 2) unsolicited 
feedback--desires to look, for males only the variables 
potent, curious, and controls ox^ n life and for females only 
the variables intelligent and popular, 3) solicited feed- 
back--admirable, for males only curious and intelligent, for 
females only the variable popular, 4) social comparison-- 
desires to look good and for males only potent and curious.
The source of self-knowledge variable presents an 
equally complex picture as only two main effects are not 
subsequently qualified by higher order significant results. 
Thus, unsolicited feedback users are "less enjoyable 
company" than self-observers and comparers and less "similar’ 
than all other characters. Results of source condition by 
trait valence are summarized in Table 16 and in Table 17 
and 18 for source by trait valence by character sex.
Due to the large number of interactions involving
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TABLE 16 'X ,r  » *#
MEAN RANK ORDER FOR SIGNIFICANT TRAIT VALENCE BY 
SOURCE OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE INTERACTIONS
Positive Traits
Lowest Highest
Variable Name Meana Me an
Admirable S0b NO UFB SC SFB
Desires to Look Good SO SC UFB SFB NO
Emotionally Healthy NO SO SFB SC UFB
Negative Traits
Admirable NO SO SFB UFB SC
Desires to Look Good. SO NO SFB SC UFB
Emotionally Healthy NO SO SC SFB UFB
aLowest means are most like variable, i.e., most 
admirable, etc.
bThe following abbreviations were used:
SO - self-observation 
UFB = unsolicited feedback 
SFB = solicited feedback 
SC - social comparison 
NO = no ending condition
Note. Underlined sources are not significantly dif­
ferent .
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TABLE 17
MEAN RANK ORDER FOR SIGNIFICANT TRAIT VALENCE BY CHARACTER
SEX BY SOURCE OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE CONDITION
INTERACTIONS FOR MALE CHARACTERS
Positive Traits
Lowest Highest
Variable Name Meana Mean
Potent S0b NO SC UFB SFB
Active. SO SC NO UFB SFB
Popular NO SO UFB SFB SC
Has Control Over Own Life NO SO SC SFB UFB
Curious SO NO SFB SC UFB
Intelligent SO NO UFB SC SFB
Negative Traits
Potent NO SFB UFB SO SC
Active NO SO UFB SFB SC
Popular SFB inC SO SC UFB
Has Control Over Own Life NO so SC UFB SFB
Curious SC SO SFB NO UFB
Intelligent NO so SFB SC UFB
"‘Lowest Means are most like variable name , i. e . most
potent, etc.
°The following abbreviations were used:
SO = self-observation 
UFB = unsolicited feedback 
SFB -- solicited feedback 
SC = social comparison 
NO ~ no ending condition
Note. Underlined sources are not significally dif­
ferent .
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TABLE 18
MEAN RANK ORDER FOR SIGNIFICANT TRAIT VALENCE BY CHARACTER
SEX BY SOURCE OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE CONDITION
INTERACTIONS FOR FEMALE CHARACTERS
Variable Name
Positive Traits
Lowest
Mean3
Highest
Mean
Potent SO SC UFB SFB NO
Active SO SC NO UFB SFB
Popular SO SFB SC NO UFB
Has Control Over Own Life NO SO SC SFB UFB
Curious SFB SC NO UFB SO
Intelligent NO SFB SC SO UFB
Negative Traits
Potent •NO SFB UFB SO SC
Active NO UFB SO SFB sc
Popular NO SFB SO UFB sc
Has Control Over Own Life NO SO SC UFB SFB
Curious NO SFB SC SO UFB
Intelligent NO SO SFB SC UFB
“Lowest means are most like variable name . i. e ., most
potent, etc,
•»°The following abbreviations were used:
SO = self-observation 
UFB - unsolicited feedback 
SFB = solicited feedback 
SC = social comparison 
NO ~ no ending condition
Note. Underlined sources are not significantly dif­
ferent .
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There is only one main effect for character sex which is not
qualified by interactions, females ’’desire to look better"
than males. In several cases, i.e., "friendly," "nice,"
"likable," and "have for a friend," the character sex
effects seem to be due to very harsh ratings given to male 
«characters who learn negative traits. With a 'few other 
variables females learning negative traits in some of the 
source of self-knowledge conditions produce the "main 
effect." These cases show trait effects for social compari­
son and self observation for "curious," "intelligent," 
"potent," "popular," and "active"; for unsolicited feedback 
with "potent,” "curious" and "active"; solicited feedback 
with "intelligent" and "active" and the no ending condition 
with "potent."
Perhaps the simplest variable to summarize is subject 
sex. Female subjects tended to rate all subjects as 
"nicer," more "likable" and more the type of person whose 
company they would "enjoy" than did male subjects. With 
the interactions involving subject sex it was found that 
with positive traits female subjects rated female characters 
as the least "active" and with negative traits each subject 
sex rates similarly sexed characters the least "active."
Results of the Ranking Variables 
The second major set of variables in this study was a 
set of ranking variables similar to those used by Schoeneman 
(1981) and Nash and Schoeneman (Note 1).
The ANOVA procedure was used to determine if the rank­
ing variables computed for the 4 traits used in the stories 
produced different results than for the 6 other traits used 
in the ranking procedure. It was also, of course, possible 
to examine the data for sex and trait valence effects.
No condition or subject sex main effects or inter­
actions reached significance. The only significant effects 
are for comparison of experimental vs. nonexperimental 
(i.e., group of 4 traits vs. group of 6 traits) for mean 
rank of self-observation (F [1, 183] = 12.50, p < .0005), 
feedback (F [1, 185] = 6.38, p < .0124), and for the number 
of times "not applicable" was used for self-observation (F 
[1, 183] = 5.54, p < .0196), and feedback (F [1, 187] - 
7.12, p < .0083) (see Table 19).
These results seem to indicate that use of the 4 
experimental words made all subjects 1) interpret self- 
observation better apparently at the expense of feedback 
and 2) rate self-observation and feedback as more 
inappropriate ways to learn things about themselves.
Results of the Personality Scales 
The last section of results to be examined involves 
the 4 personality scales. Each of these scales was used 
as a grouping variable and ANOVA's were computed for 
personality scales by source of self-knowledge condition 
and for personality scale by subject sex. The group varia­
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bles used were students high and low on each scale as 
determined by median splits (see Table 20).
TABLE 19
MEANS FOR RANKING VARIABLES
y .' •..  . ■ ■ Source of Self -Knowledge
Group Variables
Self-
Observation
Social
Feedback Comparison
Set of 4 Mean Ranks 1.61 2.08 2.18
Traits
Rating of Not 
Applicable 0.53 0.64 0.63
Set of 6 Mean Ranks 1.76 1.97 2.22
Traits
Rating of Not 
Applicable 0.39 0.49 0.56
All 10 Mean Ranks 1.69 2.03 2.20
Traits
Rating of Not 
Applicable 0.46 0.56 0.60
Self-Consciousness Scale
The self-consciousness scale is composed of three sub­
scales, each of which was examined separately. The average 
score on the Private Self-Consciousness Scale was 23.5A 
with a median value of 24. No main effects, i.e. , ’.'condi­
tion,” "subject sex," "character sex," "trait valence,” or 
"private self-consciousness," were significant for any of 
the ranking and rating variables. The only interaction to 
reach significance was for "private self-consciousness" by 
"source condition" for the potency scale (F [4, 186] - 2.54,
TABLE 20
MEDIANS, MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR 
THE PERSONALITY QUESTIONNAIRES
Standard
Scale Name Mean Deviation Median
Private Self-Consciousnessa 23.57 4.69 24
Public Self-Consciousness3 19.57 4.72 20
Social Anxiety"* 13.22 4.73 13
State Anxiety0 37.64 10.47 37
Trait Anxiety^ 39.79 9.45 39
Social Desirability Scale 14.74 5.86 15
Self-Monitoring Scale 12.16 4.03 12
o \ -These, scales compose the Self-Consciousness Scale.
“These scales compose the Spieiberger State-Trait 
Anxiety Inventory.
p < .0413). Post hoc analysis indicates that for low 
private subjects the characters in the no ending and self­
observation conditions are more potent than comparison and 
solicited feedback, unsolicited feedback users are more 
potent than solicited feedback users, while no differences 
were found for subjects high in private self-consciousness. 
It was also noted that the low trait subjects rate self­
observation more potent than high subjects while high sub­
jects rate solicited feedback as more potent than low trait 
subj ects.
For the Public Self-Consciousness scale, with a mean of
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19.57 and a median of 20, only one significant difference 
was found. High public subjects rate characters as desiring 
to look better than do their lower counterparts (F [1, 180] = 
5.88, p < .0163).
The third measure of the Self-Consciousness Scale is 
social anxiety which had a mean of 13.22 and a median of 13. 
Social anxiety produced twm> significant interactions with 
source of self-knowledge condition: the evaluative (F [4, 
186] = 2.57, p < .0338) and potency scale of the semantic 
differential (F [4, 186] = 2.87, p < .0243).
Post hoc analysis indicates that low social anxiety 
scorers report self-observers as better people and comparers 
as worse people while subjects in the high social anxiety 
group report reverse tendencies.
Results of the potency scale show that low social 
anxiety subjects rate self-observers and receivers of 
unsolicited feedback as more potent and receivers of 
solicited feedback as less potent while high social anxiety 
subjects report the opposite pattern,
A second set of two-way interactions was produced 
between trait valence and the Social Anxiety Scale for the 
following variables: likable (F [1, 182] = 6.93, p < .0092), 
nice (F [1, 182] - 3.95, p < .0483), popular (F [1, 180] = 
5.38, p < .0215), enjoy the person's company (F [1, 180] = 
9.74, p < .0020), have for a friend (F [1, 180] = 9.09, p < 
.0029), emotionally healthy (F [1, 180] - 6.13, p < .0142)’ 
and in control of own life (F [1, 180] = 4.59, p < .0335).
Post hoc analysis of these interactions suggests that 
high social anxiety subjects rate learners using both posi- 
tive and negative traits to be more likable, nice, popular, 
enjoyable, emotionally healthy and in control than low 
social anxiety scorers rate users of negative traits. High 
and low social anxiety subjects also see positive traits 
differently. High subjects see positive trait users as more 
the type of person to have for a friend and as less emo­
tionally healthy and less in control while low social 
anxiety subjects would not have them for a friend yet see 
them as healthier and more in control.
Two significant three-way interactions were found 
between trait valence, character sex and social anxiety.
For the variables popular (F [1, 180] =7.18, p < .0081) and 
curious (F [1, 180] = 5.09, p < .0252), post hoc tests 
indicate that low social anxiety subjects see the positive 
trait female characters group as more popular and curious 
than high social anxiety subjects.
In addition the low group sees negative males as more 
curious than the high group. Significant differences are 
also made between the different characters by the low social 
anxiety group. They see negative females as less popular 
and curious than positive males and females and also see 
negative males as less popular than positive females.
State-Trait Anxiety Scale
The results of this scale produced a state anxiety mean
nificant effects for the state scale and none for the trait 
measure.
One main effect for state anxiety was found for the 
variable admirable-not admirable, F (1, 182) = 9.12, p < 
.0029. The direction of this effect was such that low state 
anxiety subjects rate story characters as more admirable 
than high anxiety subjects. The only other significant 
results for state anxiety are for two interactions with 
subject sex: For the variables admirable (F [1, 188] =
4.04, p < .0460) and for desire to look good (F [1, 186] - 
6.39, p < .0123). These results suggest female subjects 
low in state anxiety see characters as more admirable and 
desiring to look good than highly anxious females while low 
anxiety males report characters as more admirable than high 
anxiety female subjects.
Social Desirability Scale
For subjects in the present study a mean of 14.74 and 
median of 15 was obtained. Analysis of this personality 
characteristic produced one significant main effect for the 
variable Mcurious-not curious" (F [1, 186] = 6.44, p < .0120) 
and no interactions with source of self-knowledge, subject 
sex or any of the other variables. The direction of the 
finding reported above suggests that high social desira-
of 37.64 and median of 37 and a trait scale me a n  of 39.79
and median of 39. These analyses produced only a few sig-
r ■
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bility subjects see characters as less curious than do their 
low social desirability counterparts.
Self-Monitoring Scale
The self-Monitoring Scale produced a mean of 12.16 and 
a median of 12. This scale produced no main effects but 
several significant two- and three-way interactions.
Self-monitoring by source condition produced one sig­
nificant effect fof curious-not curious, F (4, 180) = 2.45, 
p < .0479. This result is such that it suggests low self­
monitors view self-observation users as more curious and 
unsolicited feedback users less curious than do high self­
monitors. Additionally it indicates low self-monitors view 
the self-observation user as more curious than the 
unsolicited feedback user. The high self-monitors view the 
no source user as more curious than all but the unsolicited 
feedback group.
Self-monitoring by trait valence was significant for 
the variable, has control over own life, F (1, 180) ~ 4.00, 
p < .0479. The direction of these results suggest that 
negative trait learners are seen as having less control 
than those using positive traits by both high and low self­
monitors. The high self-monitors also see negative trait 
users as having less control than the low group.
One interaction was also produced with subject sex for 
admirable-not admirable, F (1, 188) = 4.25, p < .0406. This
The final set of res\alts are three three-way inter­
actions, for the activity scale of the semantic differential 
for trait valence by character sex by self-monitoring (F fl, 
192] = 8.75, p < .0035), character sex by subject sex by 
self-monitoring (F [1, 192] = 5.60, p < .0190), and trait 
valence by subject sex by self-monitoring (F [1, 192] =
4.36, p < .0380) .
Post hoc analysis of the interaction with trait and 
character sex reveals that .both low and high self-monitors 
viewT female characters learning a negative trait as the 
least active group. The high self-monitors report that 
negative-female and positive-male, are less active, positive 
females are more active than the low self-monitors group.
For the interaction with character and subject sex the data 
suggest female low self-monitoring subjects report female 
characters as less active than high female subjects. Both 
low male and female subjects report the opposite sex as 
more active than do high subjects. In the final interaction 
with "trait valence" and "subject sex" low self-monitoring 
male subjects see negative traits as more active while low 
female subjects see positive traits as more active, than do 
their high counterparts. Low female subjects also see 
negative traits as less active than high females.
Summary
To briefly review the effects of the personality
suggests female high self-monitors view characters as less
admirable than do either high or low male subjects.
questionnaires, it was found that only two scales, State 
Anxiety and Social Anxiety, produced interpretable results. 
State Anxiety results suggest that both male and female low 
anxiety subjects report characters as more '’admirable” than 
high anxiety subjects. The results of the other scale 
producing significant interpretable results, social anxiety, 
suggests that: low social anxiety subjects tended to report 
self-observers as better and more potent people . A set of
interactions with trait valence suggested that high social
j  i ' U.. "  ■ /  ' ::'%  ■.' ■ ■
anxiety subjects see positive and negative trait users in
a better light than low social anxiety subjects see nega­
tive trait learners.
CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
Three aspects of this study's findings are considered 
below. The first deals with the ranking variables which 
are similar to those used by Schoeneman (1981) and Nash and 
Schoeneman (Note 1). These data served as a replication and 
point of comparison between the present and earlier studies 
of the -reports of the sources of self-knowledge. The second 
part considers the data of primary importance to this study; 
that generated by the subjects' ratings of the story char­
acters. The final area of discussion is a look at the 
results of the personality questionnaires. During each of 
these independent discussions, the predictions from Chapter 
II and the results from Chapter IV are frequently summarized 
and briefly reviewed.
The Ranking Variables
Briefly restated, the rationale for including a set of 
ranking variables similar to those used by Schoeneman (1981) 
and Nash and Schoeneman (Note 1) was twofold. First of all 
it allowed for some comparison between this study and the 
earlier ones. Secondly it allowed for an experimental 
manipulation to see if the source of self-knowledge
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conditions would affect the ranking of either the 4 adjec­
tives used in the experimental stories or the 6 adjectives 
subjects were not exposed to during the story rating part 
of this study.
The main finding of. the ranking variables is a repli­
cation of the mean rank results reported by Schoeneman 
(1981) and Nash and Schoeneman (Note 1). The mean ranks, 
for self-observation/feedback/social comparison, of 1.61/ 
2.08/2.18 for the 4 adjective, set and 1.76/1.97/2.22 for the 
remaining 6 adjectives are quite similar to figures reported 
by Schoeneman (1931) 1.60/2.0/2.3 and Nash and Schoeneman 
(Note 1) 1.58/1.r 7/2.33. In this study, just as In all 
previous ones, the mean ranks fall into non-overlapping 
ranges such that self-observation is ranked as the most 
preferred source, social comparison the least preferred and 
feedback Is in the middle position.
Such a close replication of earlier results was not 
obtained with the "not applicable" rating used in the. rank­
ing procedure. The average ratings of "not applicable," for 
self-observation/feecibsck/social comparison, for the 4 
traits were . 5 3 / .64/.63, for the 6 traits .39/.49/.56 while 
Schoeneman (1981) reported mean ranks of . 2 / . 1 / . 7  and Nash 
and Schoeneman (Note 1) reported .07/.33/.50. The main 
difference seems to be a more frequent use of the "not 
applicable" rating for self-observation in the present 
study.
One possible explanation for this difference in
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subjects’ use of the not applicable rating involves a 
methodological difference between the present and earlier 
studies. In this study subjects were given the ranking 
items with the adjective already in place. Schoeneman 
(1981) and Nash and Schoeneman (Note 1) both used a random 
number procedure to select adjectives from a completed 
Adjective Checklist (Gough & Heilbrun 1965) which subjects 
then inserted into the ranking sentence stem. Thus, the 
current subjects ranked a set of adjectives which may or may 
not have been appropriate for them while subjects in the 
previous studies ranked adjectives they had earlier indi­
cated as being self-descriptors. In this case, then it is 
likely that it is the adjectives themselves which are 
"not applicable" and not the sources of self-knowledge.
It is encouraging that, overall, these ranking results 
so closely replicate the results of Schoeneman (1981) and 
Nash and Schoeneman (Note 1). This additional replication 
underscores both the robustness and reliability of the 
report's of the sources of self-knowledge phenomenon first 
noted by Schoeneman by showing that his typically urbanized 
eastern subjects and two temporally separated groups of 
rural midwestern subjects all produce similar results.
This replication is also important to the current investi­
gation.
Had the ranking variables failed to replicate 
Schoeneman's earlier work it would have been very difficult 
to interpret any of the other portions of this study. By no
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means does the replication allow the results of the self­
projection hypothesis to be freely (and inappropriately) 
generalized to other populations. However, it does indicate 
that the present group of subjects reports the sources of 
self-knowledge in a manner consistent with the other 
reported studies.
The second reason the ranking data were included was to 
see if subject sex, source of self-knowledge condition or 
the number of traits (i.e., 4 vs. 6) produced any signifi­
cant differences. In Chapter IV it was noted that the only 
significant results were four main effects for the variable 
"number of traits." These results show that in comparison 
to the 6-adjective group the 4-adjective group ranked self­
observation lowest hence a better soui'ce, feedback higher 
hence a worse source, while both self-observation and feed­
back are rated "not applicable" more often.
One possible explanation for these four effects is that 
the four adjectives used in the stories are less desirable 
and/or less representative of traits possessed by student 
subjects. Unknown to the author while this study was being 
designed, the adjectives chosen for use in the other 6 
ranking items were included in Anderson's (1968) table of 
likableness ratings. Examination of these likableness 
ratings showed that the average rating for the experimental 
words was 299 while the other 6 adjectives had an average 
score of 411 (within a range of 26 to 573 where higher 
equals more "likability"). This might make the subjects
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more likely to disavow having these 4 less "likable" traits 
an outcome which may be reflected in the more frequent use 
of "not applicable" while those who do want to learn about 
the trait prefer the more private mode of self-observation. 
Currently such a hypothesis is only speculative and no 
definitive statement can be made regarding these data since 
the meaningfulness discrepancy was confounded by prior 
exposure to some words and none to others. The hypothesis 
that different sources of self-knowledge are preferable 
when learning about different, traits is an attractive and 
plausible one; however, additional research is the only 
method to determine the validity of such a hypothesis.
For completeness sake it also should be noted that, 
given the large number of analyses done and small number of 
significant effects found, it is possible that these effects 
are chance occurrences. Once again, additional research is 
the only method to document the nature, including the 
reliability, of these findings.
The Story Rating Variables
Of all the predictions made in the course of this 
investigation, those concerning the self-projection hypothe­
sis are the most important. Due to the repeated measures 
design of the story rating task it was possible to examine 
several other independent variables in addition to looking 
at the effects of different source of self-knowledge condi­
tions. The present section covers all of these variables
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beginning with the effects of trait valence, the ratings of 
the sources and finally the effects of subject and character 
sex.
Trait Valence Hypotheses
Though the effects of trait valence are not the primary 
issues of importance in this project, it seemed reasonable 
to examine them before going on to the self-projection 
hypotheses. This decision was based not only on this 
variable's large number of significant results and numerous 
interactions but because an examination of trait valence 
will also facilitate, an understanding of other hypotheses 
and results in this study.
The results of trait valence indicate that, whenever 
this dimension produces significant results, learners of 
positive traits are rated more toward the positive end of 
the item. pair. Even though the significant results of this 
variable are often isolated to a specific sex or source of 
self-knowledge condition, the finding that negative traits 
consistently, i.e., only one exception, produce more "nega­
tive" ratings gives strong support to the notion that 
personality judgments may be organized schematically (Taylor 
& Crocker 1981). Although there are no empirical data on 
this point, it seems quite unlikely that a relationship 
actually exists between the learning of bad traits and low 
intelligence and any of the other 17 undesirable traits. 
However, the schematic organization hypothesis can account
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for such a finding. Many studies were cited earlier which 
suggest that a connotative or semantic similarity between 
events is often used as a basis for perceiving a correlation 
to exist between them. The subjects in this study seem to 
have fallen prey to the appealing yet incorrect belief that 
good goes with good and bad with bad.
Earlier it was mentioned that it was important to 
examine the trait valence data before going on to other 
data. Although the data do not address the issue of whether 
or not the sources of self-knowledge are represented sche­
matically, they do offer support for the position that 
subjects' ratings of story characters may be influenced by 
schematically organized information. A second implication 
is that the positive and.negative trait groups may have an 
empirical distinction between them; this notion is clearly 
supported by the numerous interactions of trait valence with 
other independent variables.
The Self-Projection Hypothesis
Before the discussion of the self-projection hypothesis 
two reminders are in order. First, it should be recalled 
that in this portion of the experimental task although sub­
jects were called on to rate story characters who learn 
about themselves via the different sources of self-knowledge, 
it is assumed that they are actually making decisions based 
on a schematic-like representation of the source of self- 
knowledge used by that character. Secondly, to briefly
restate the self-projection predictions, it was expected 
that users of Self-observation would be. seen in the most 
positive manner, users of social comparison in the least 
positive, ratings of users 6f unsolicited feedback would 
vary with trait valence (the compliment or insult), while 
those for solicited feedback and the no source of self- 
knowledge ending would produce more neutral or "middle of 
the road" evaluations relative to the other sources.
The source of self-knowledge condition analyses pro­
duced mixed support for the predictions mentioned above; 
self-observation, solicited feedback and social comparison 
most closely followed these predictions while unsolicited 
feedback and the no source condition did not. A second 
point that must be considered is that subjects' ratings of 
the different sources are much more complex in terms of 
interacting with trait valence and character sex than 
predicted.
Based on the reports given by subjects of this study, 
users of self-observation seem to often be rated differently 
than users of other sources. As the data summarized in 
Chapter IV in Tables 16, 17, and 12 illustrate, the self­
observation bias generally involves favorable ratings. 
Indeed, in only one case, i.e., positive female characters 
using unsolicited feedback are more "curious" than self­
observers, is this source rated inferior to another source. 
In the remaining cases it is either better than or equal to 
the other sources. This is very strong support for the
hypothesis that subjects' preference for self-observation 
(Schoeneman 1981; Nash & Schoeneman Note 1; Schoeneman,
Tabor & Nash Note 2) is due to an implicit bia'. The item 
pairs which reached significance plus trait and character 
sex restrictions where applicable suggest some characteris­
tics of this bias. For both character sexes this bias seems 
to tap social approval features, being "enjoyable," 
"similar," "admirable," and "desiring to look good." A 
second set is more character sex specific and typically 
involves males learning both positive and negative traits 
but only females learning positive traits. This set seems 
similar to locus of control and involves being more "active, 
"potent," "in control," and "curious" than sources such as 
social comparison or the feedback conditions.
Social comparison was reported, as predicted, as a 
relatively unfavorable method of learning about the self.
It would be incorrect, however, to characterize social com­
parison as the least favorable of all the sources on all 
rating scales. Overall it is the least "admirable" source 
when negative traits are learned. The three-way inter­
actions (trait by character sex by source condition) show 
that, generally, with negative traits it is less "curious," 
"potent," "active," and "in control" than'the feedback 
groups while with positive traits it is more "active" than 
the feedback groups. This outcome contradicts the predic­
tion that social comparison users would suffer less from 
negative traits because it is a. private source. One
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possible explanation for the preference of feedback over 
comparing when learning negative traits may be that it 
seems to take more strength of character to solicit feedback 
in negative circumstances. Thus feedback’s use involves 
what some consider to be open and healthy self-disclosure 
(Jourard 1971) while comparison may seem to have a component 
of purposeful secretiveness. All such speculation aside, 
this finding does indicate that, for some reason, comparison 
is reported to be particularly inappropriate when learning 
about undesirable traits.
Thus, the most frequent result was that comparison 
served as a negative anchor. That is to say other sources 
were typically rated better relative to it. Indeed, com­
parison was never'reported in a. manner suggesting that it 
was preferable to self-observation and only twice was it 
preferable to solicited feedback or the no ending group.
Such findings are consistent with the self-projection 
prediction that social comparison is the least often 
reported source of self-knowledge (Scnoeneman 1981; Nash & 
Schoeneman Note 1) due to people's perception of it as an 
inferior method of self-validation.
It is more difficult to evaluate the predictions made 
regarding solicited, feedback. Recall that this source was 
expected to receive a "middle of the road" rating. The most 
noticeable trend with this variable is for male characters 
who use it to be seen as less "active" and "in control" 
regardless of trait valence, less "potent" and "popular"
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with positive traits and less "intelligent” with negative 
traits. Female users are less "active" and more "curious" 
regardless of trait valence, more "in control" with positive 
ones and more "potent" with negative ones. Thus, data sug­
gest the predictions of an intermediate ranking are more 
correct for female than male characters.
The remaining source of self-knowledge conditions,
unsolicited feedback and the no source ending, produced
results' which differed substantially from the predictions.
It had been predicted that with positive traits unsolicited
feedback would be rated favorably as a compliment and with
negative traits rated less favorably as an insult. However,
unsolicited feedback was consistently reported as a poor
way to learn about the self. In no instance w?as it reported
as superior to self-observation, the no source condition or
solicited feedback. An interpretation more in keeping with 
>the data might be that, as a hapless recipient of informa­
tion, the social situation seemed out of the character's 
control. This-perceived loss of control then may have 
resulted in a very poor evaluation of these characters by 
the subjects.
The results of the no source condition also deviated 
in a rather surprising manner from the predictions made 
about it. Not only did this condition fail to produce 
neutral ratings, in most cases it resulted in the best 
character evaluations. This is especially true for female 
characters learning negative traits. Since subjects most
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favorably endorse characters who learn nothing about them­
selves., i.e., those who use none of the sources of self- 
knowledge, the question "Is it better to not learn anything 
about yourself?" is raised.
The data certainly seem to suggest that, based on self- 
projection features, not only can subjects differentiate 
between various methods of learning about themselves, but 
that they might prefer to just not learn. Alternatively it 
may be that subjects simply assume that characters are 
already in possession of self-knowledge and thus seem more 
self-reliant, potent and secure. These presumed character­
istics would almost certainly produce very favorable ratings 
much like the ones found in this study. Regardless of which 
interpretation of this data is accepted, it brings up an 
interesting point: it is better not to be actively involved 
in the self-validation process. The data do not address 
whether this is because an individual does not want to learn 
anything or simply prefers to think that information about 
him or herself is already possessed. Should the latter 
account be correct a doiible standard is suggested? there is 
more approval for having knowledge about the self than for 
any of the methods of obtaining this knowledge.
To briefly reiterate the predictions and questions 
associated with the two sex variables it may be recalled 
that evidence supporting a male, preference for social com­
parison was expected. Since no predictions other than this
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Subject sex analyses reveal that women subjects reported 
story characters as "nicer," more "likable" and "more as 
someone with whom they would associate" than did male sub­
jects. Since subject sex failed to produce any significant 
interactions with the source of self-knowledge condition, 
no support for the notion that men report social comparison 
more favorably than women can be reported.
The analysis of character sex data showed only one main 
effect, i.e., women are rated more as "desiring to look 
good," that was not subsequently influenced by interactions. 
Other character sex effects are more complex. One pattern 
suggests males learning negative traits cause the signifi­
cant effects while another pattern involves females learning 
negative traits in specific source of self-knowledge 
conditions.
The first pattern, composed of the rating variables 
"friendly," "likable," "nice" and "have for a friend," seem 
to tap elements of interpersonal attraction. With this set 
of variables males learning negative traits are reported to 
be less attractive, i.e., less "friendly," less "likable," 
etc., than males who learn positive traits or women who 
learn either positive or negative traits. These interaction 
data seem to suggest that in terms of interpersonal attrac­
tion women are not affected by trait valence while men 
suffer significantly from association with negative traits.
one were made, the sex variables also constitute an e x p l o r a ­
tory phase of this study.
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The second pattern, which is more complex than the 
first, involves variables which seem to make up more of a 
"personal effectiveness" component involving variables such 
as "curious," "intelligent," "potent," "active" and 
"popular." On all five of these variables, the character 
sex effects are due to the very negative ratings given to 
women characters learning negative traits in, primarily, the 
social comparison and self-observation conditions. The 
variables "curious," "potent," and "active" also produce a 
character sex effect for unsolicited feedback, "intelli­
gent" and "active" for solicited feedback, while only 
"potent" was significant in the no ending group. One 
hypothesis regarding these data is'that women are both more 
adversely affected by learning negative traits than men in 
terms of "personal effectiveness" and affected more in 
internal, private modes of self-validation such as self- 
obsex'vation and social comparison.
The findings that association with negative traits 
leads to lower ratings for men on "interpersonal attraction" 
variables and lower ratings for women on "personal effec­
tiveness" variables is especially interesting in light of 
the "traditional sex stereotypes." For example, Deaux 
(1976) reports that men are typically seen as independent, 
competitive, objective, dominant, active, logical, ambitious, 
self-confident as well as less emotionally responsive. 
Similarly Heath and Gurwitz (Note 7) report men as
independent, aggressive, competitive, strong, logical, 
competent and unemotional.
The set of traits involved in the interactions having 
to do with interpersonal attraction seems to be more in 
line with a traditional female stereotype. This is quite 
interesting because the use of positive traits does not 
affect male characters and, indeed, they are not signifi­
cantly different from the ratings of the females. The 
learning of negative traits results in a significant and 
substantial decrement in males' ratings of attractiveness. 
Overall the lack of differentiation of women characters by 
trait valence suggests that women are rated high on the 
interpersonal attraction dimension (composed of stereo- 
typically female attributes) regardless of trait valence.
By way of contrast the trait variable is very important for 
male characters and suggests that when males are judged on 
traditionally female traits it js done more critically, 
though not necessarily more accurately, and situational 
factors are given more weight.
A somewhat similar interpretation emerges from the 
second pattern showing women characters suffer from associa­
tion with negative traits on traditionally male traits.
These data suggest that while negative traits somewhat 
affect both sexes, women are still significantly affected to 
a greater degree and more often than men.
To summarize, it seems that each sex's association with 
negative traits results in harsher character ratings on
items traditionally thought to be representative of the 
opposite sex. One possible account for this is that when 
judging, for example, women on "women's traits," trait 
valence information is not used because of our schemas of 
women •Which allow us to rate them favorable on the tradi­
tionally "women's traits." For example we all "know" that 
women are "nice" so we can discount the fact that she is 
learning a negative (not "nice") trait because it is not 
really true since "we know how women really are." However, 
when judging a man on the "women's traits" people may not 
be able to recall appropriate schemas with which to make 
decisions and may then use the "trait valence" data as the 
judgmental criteria. Even if a schema can be recalled, it 
would violate the traditional sex. role (a sensitive man or 
an aggressive woman). This might cause people to disregard 
the schema as being "in error” and thus trait valence data 
is consulted in making the judgment. This latter hypothesis 
seems somewhat unlikely .since, as presented earlier, research 
suggests.people are very poor at detecting bchemas that are 
"in error." These two hypotheses would be interesting ones 
to investigate in future research.
Several other points in regard to the "character sex" 
data are also important. First of all, it can be noted that 
the character sex ratings are in agreement with the stereo­
type literature such as reported by Deaux (1976) and Heath 
and Gurwitz (Note 7). The only possible disagreement 
involves the current findings noted above which suggest that
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character sex is not a simple effect but interacts with 
other variables.
A second point worth noting is that there was an over­
lap between the way women story characters were rated and 
the way women subjects tended to respond. This overlap 
involved the variables ’’likable" and "have for a friend."
It would be an inappropriate overgeneralization (especially 
in the context of a study investigating implicit and 
erroneous personality judgments) to conclude that this data 
suggest that women are actually more "likable” and prefera­
ble to "have for a friend" even though this Interpretation 
has a certain common sense validity to it.
A move parsimonious interpretation is that the women 
subjects were aware of the "traditional" women's stereotype 
and for some reason their ratings conformed to it. Such a 
hypothesis has been demonstrated by Zanna and Pack (1975) 
who found that women could conform to stereotypes held by 
desirable others. Whether or not the women subjects in the 
present study perceived psychological research as having 
positive or negative demand characteristics is an empirical 
question beyond the scope of this study.
At this point all the main effects and interactions of 
the story character rating study have been presented. The 
final aspect of the story rating study was the data produced 
by the ratings of the accuracy, believability and relia­
bility of the sources of self-knowledge. The predictions 
that these variables would parallel character rating were
not supported; indeed, the only significant effects to be 
found were main effects for trait valence on all three 
ratings. Thus, all sources are more accurate, believable 
and reliable when learning about good traits.
Putting aside intuitive or common sense interpretations 
the real importance of these data is why trait valence 
reached significance in the absence of any other main 
effects or interactions. In light of the demonstration that 
personality judgments of characters are influenced by 
schematic-like properties of the different sources, it is 
very surprising that the ratings of the sources themselves 
do not also show these effects. Several interpretations of 
these data are possible. The first, and simplest, would 
suggest that subjects cannot or do not distinguish between 
the accuracy, reliability and believability of the different 
sources. This seems unlikely especially given the pro­
nounced effects of the sources on the personality judgments. 
However, it is probably more important to note that in each 
set of stories the character never voiced dissatisfaction or 
questioned the source of self-knowledge that he or she had 
used. Thus, this passive acceptance of information may have 
been interpreted by subjects as a "vote of confidence" for 
the source.
Research findings from the social judgment and attribu- 
tional literature suggest another explanatory hypothesis.
For some reason it seems that the effects of the trait 
valence dimension were so powerful that they were "carried
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over" onto this set of ratings while the less powerful 
effects either lacked such strength or were for some reason 
discounted from judgments of the actual sources. This 
"discounting process" may have been the availability 
heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman 1982). The vividness 
criteria, discussed as one form of the availability 
heuristic in Chapter II, suggest that vivid data and con­
crete examples are more often used in decisions than more 
abstract or pallid information. The stories used for the 
character rating task were concrete and vivid examples of, 
for example, a self-observer in contrast to the source 
rating task which involved rating an abstract concept such 
as self-observation. Accordingly, subjects were likely to 
underutilize information while rating the actual source and 
hence differences were less likely to be found.
Similar conclusions can also be drawn by examining a 
special case, of the availability heuristic--the fundamental 
attribution error (Nisbett & Ross 1980). This proposal 
states that attributions of causality are more often made 
to characterological factors than to situational ones 
because of the vividness and salience of the actor as 
opposed to the situation. Thus, in the present study self­
observation, or any source, seems more a function or trait 
of the story character while any features of self­
observation as an independent process are much less apparent.
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Personality Scale Variables
The only two scale results meriting discussion are the 
Spielberger State Anxiety Scale and the Social Anxiety Sub­
scale of The Self-Consciousness Scale. Spielberger State 
Anxiety results indicate that low-anxiety subjects report 
story characters as more admirable than do high-anxiety 
subjects. More specifically low-anxiety female subjects 
report characters as more admirable and desiring to look 
good than high-anxiety females, while similarly, low- 
anxiety males report the characters as more admirable than 
high-anxiety males. While this result is interesting the 
focal nature of one effect on only one variable limits its 
contribution to this study. Indeed, it has nothing to offer 
regarding the reports of the sources of self-knowledge and 
very little to an understanding of the more general study of 
stereotypes.
Social anxiety was the only scale to produce signifi­
cant results applicable to the reports of the sources of 
self-knowledge. Although no main effects were found, social 
anxiety by source conditions interactions were evident on 2 
of the semantic differential scales. Low social anxiety 
subjects report self-observers the most "potent1' and "good" 
characters while subjects high on social anxiety report 
self-observers as the least "potent" and "worst" characters. 
The high social anxiety subjects see comparers as the "best" 
characters and unsolicited feedback users as the most potent
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while low social anxiety subjects see these source users as 
the "worst" and least potent respectively.
It is interesting that, based on other data from this 
study, low social anxiety subjects prefer the source gen­
erally seen in the best light -while high social anxiety 
subjects prefer the sources which generated the worst 
evaluations. It may be that high, social anxiety subjects, 
who typically feel ill at ease in social situations (Buss 
1980), feel that direct comparison or spontaneous feedback 
from others is necessary to assuage their feelings of dis­
comfort in social situations.
Alternatively, it can be postulated that the high 
social anxiety subjects feel uncomfortable because they 
hold a minority opinion. These subjects report the best and 
worst sources in a pattern opposite to the majority of sub­
jects in this study. One may speculate that these subjects 
may be aware that they hold a divergent, or statistically 
abnormal, view and because of this feel uncomfortable.
’Other results of the Social Anxiety Scale do not deal 
directly with the study of the sources of self-knowledge. 
Interactions with, trait valence reveal that high social- 
anxiety subjects tend to be kinder in their ratings of those 
characters learning about negative traits. They report them 
as being more likable, nice, popular, enjoyable, emotionally 
healthy, and in control. Perhaps this is because the 
process of learning negative things about yourself is not 
always a safe-feeling process, and thus seems to coincide
more with their own feelings of social discomfort. Some 
support for this is evident since, in contrast to low social 
anxiety subjects, the more socially anxious individuals see 
positive trait learners as less emotionally healthy and less
. . . . . . .  ;;'£v
in control yet as more the type of person to have for a 
friend.
General, Discussion and Summary
By far the most important results in this study are the 
ones showing that the source of self-knowledge ending condi­
tions differentially affect the ratings of the story 
characters. These results are similar to those predicted by 
the self-projection hyp thesis, an outcome which suggests 
that self projection and the notion that peoples' tools of 
social judgment influence the reports of the sources of 
self-knowledge may have been correct. This study measured 
this influence by presenting subjects with a. set of 19 
traits which all appear to be different yet are not dis­
tinctly different in terms of the self-projection hypothesis' 
predictions. Such a design facilitates the taking of a 
descriptive approach, to this study, i.e., what traits 
characterize self-observers, comparers and so on. Indeed, 
in attempting to draw overall conclusions from this study, 
one is limited to such descriptions since it is not possible 
to articulate which social judgment features are responsible 
for these results.
Just as it made no difference whether sources were
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predicted to be associated with traits in a schematic 
fashion or through heuristic use, it also makes no differ­
ence interpretively. Indeed, it seems likely that there is 
both heuristic and schematic involvement in this association 
A finer discrimination of the relative contributions of the 
various tools of social judgment is dependent on greater 
refinements within the study of judgmental processes.
Thus, to take the descriptive approach to this study, 
it was found that the source difference involved potency, 
activity and a group of traits which seem to tap social 
approval features. The predicted evaluative difference was 
not found in this study. It seems that subjects do make 
characterlogical distinctions based on the sources of self- 
knowledge, people use, however, they are subtler than the ones 
predicted. This does-not minimize the importance of this 
study's findings. It still must be noted that the subjects 
have inferred that the story characters possess certain 
traits based on inappropriate information, i.e., data that 
is situationally based at best. Because the Inferences are 
subtler it seems such inappropriate use of social judgment 
is more likely to go undetected and also to go uncorrected.
A surprising finding was subjects' high ranking, 
especially in the negative trait condition, of characters in 
the "no source" ending condition. This may be interpreted 
in two ways: subjects may not like to learn things about 
themselves, in particular if it is something bad, or sub­
jects may assume that these characters have already acquired
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self-knowledge which makes them seem very self-reliant, 
secure and ’’internal." While these results were not pre­
dicted the data clearly show them, to be both highly 
significant and widespread effects.
Another surprising finding involved solicited and 
unsolicited feedback and shows that these types of feedback 
are reported in quite different manners. Solicited feedback 
remained somewhat neutral and frequently was not differ- 
entiated from even the extreme rating polarities. By 
contrast unsolicited feedback was seen very poorly. Perhaps 
this was because these characters aid not seem to be in 
control of the social situation or, in Jellison and Green’s 
(1981) terms, their method of learning showed no components 
of "internality.”
The schematic or heuristic component of social judg­
ments in this study seems to involve internality in several 
specific ways. The feedback results show that being the 
initiator of the self-learning process, i.e., solicited as 
opposed to unsolicited feedback, results in more favorable 
ratings. The ratings of self-observation, solicited feed­
back and social comparison indicate that once one begins the 
self-validation process the method chosen also has self- 
presentational effects. If one can be self-reliant, such 
as in self-observation, the norm of internality is met in 
both the intent and process of self-validation and results 
in the highest ratings. Results also suggest that one form 
of internality, possession of self-knowledge In the absence
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Solicited feedback and social comparison both meet the 
norm of internal!ty in the domain of intent to learn but do 
not meet it in the process component. The process used then 
seems to be evaluated on an almost Jourardian (1971) notion. 
That is that more open direct validation from others is seen 
as preferable to the possibly surreptitious use of social 
comparison.
It is interesting that the personality scales failed to 
contribute significantly to an understanding of subjects' 
reports of the sources of self-knowledge. Since the inclu­
sion of these measures was purely exploratory, the lack of 
effects is neither detrimental or helpful to the self­
projection hypothesis. Perhaps the only conclusion which 
can be drawn currently is that the implicit organization 
found in this study does not seem to be affected by these 
few psychometrically assessed traits. Naturally it may be 
that other traits, if studied in the present context, would 
further the understanding of these phenomena; however, this 
currently does not seem to be a promising topic for inquiry.
The other somewhat -independent part of this study, the 
ranking variables, produced more important results. The 
replication of the "mean rank" data was certainly of sig­
nificance. Even though Schoeneman’s original work has been 
replicated once, it is reassuring to see the effects first 
noted by him replicated again. Had these results not been
of any ongoing self-validation process, m a y  produce the most
favorable ratings of all.
repeated the whole purpose of this study would have been 
questionable; there would have been little justification to 
explain an unreliable effect. So in addition to supporting 
the hypothesis of reports of the sources of self-knowledge 
as a phenomenon worth researching, this study also demon­
strates an equivalence in the perception of this phenomena 
between earlier and the present group of subjects.
The main contribution of this study is not the replica- 
tion of Schoeneman’s (1981) work but showing that the 
effects first reported by him seem to be a function of 
implicit notions about the sources of self-knowledge. 
Findings such as the ones in this study reiterate the 
importance of issearching social judgment phenomena. Any 
time large numbers of people hold similar sets of beliefs, 
whether they are beliefs about racial or ethnic stereotypes 
or about the sources of self-knowledge, it is important for 
psychologists to attempt to understand and explain them.
While there are, of course, many issues still unanswered 
and unresolved in the study of people's reports of the 
sources of self-knowledge, this study has made an important 
first step by establishing a link between the study of such 
reports and the growing body of 3 -ature about shortcom­
ings of social judgment.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
EXPERIMENTAL STORIES’ • • • '
APPENDIX A
In this section copies of the four basic experimental 
stories and the different source of self-knowledge endings 
are reproduced. In each example the same trait and sex 
combination, i.e. , idealistic-male, is used. Dui'ing the 
experiment these same basic stories were modified to other 
trait and sex combinations by merely changing the adjective 
and/or character names and pronouns.
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STORY 1
The movie had been enjoyable, and. after it was over 
Jack and Harry decided to go get a pizza. They hadn't seen 
each other for over a year, since high school graduation. 
Each had moved to a different city to start college and now 
summer vacation had brought them together. Now that they 
had some time to relax together, they decided to catch up 
on old times. They soon found themselves enjoying the 
pizza and conversation much more than the movie. They 
talked about old times and new experiences; living away from 
home at college, what the old crowd was up to and how they 
had changed. All this got Jack to thinking about how some 
things never change; he asked Harry, "Do you realize how 
idealistic our old group was? Most of them are still that 
way, too."
Self-Observation Ending
Both friends were silent for a while, thinking. Jack 
started to wonder about himself. Was he also an idealistic 
person? He started to recall times before and since gradua­
tion when he felt and acted, idealistic. It seemed to him 
that he could recall so many instances of himself as being 
idealistic that he knew that he must be an idealistic 
person.
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Unsolicited Feedback Ending
Both friends were silent for a while, thinking. Jack 
started to wonder about himself. Was he also an idealistic 
person? Harry broke the silence by saying, "Speaking of 
being idealistic, I would say that I consider you to be an 
idealistic person." It seemed to Jack that Harry’s comment 
made an impression; he felt like he knew that he must be an 
idealistic person.
Solicited Feedback Ending
Both friends were silent for a while, thinking. Jack 
started to wonder about himself. Was he an idealistic 
person? Jack looked at Harry and asked him about it.
Harry said, "Idealistic? Yeah, sure, I think you're 
idealistic.” It seemed to Jack that his own question and 
Harry's answer made an impression; he felt like he knew 
that he must be an idealistic person.
Social Comoarisen Ending
Both friends were silent for a while thinking. Jack
started to wonder about himself. Was he also an idealistic
person? He thought about his actions and feelings, and
compared them with those he had observed in his friend
Harry. It seemed to Jack that compared to Harry, he himself
owas' much more idealistic; Jack felt like he knew himself to 
be an idealistic person.
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STORY 2
One night two friend's get together to watch some 
television and talk. Dan and Steve spent several hours 
together that night, something they hadn't done in a long 
time. They watched a movie on TV for a few hours and after 
it went off thev sat around talking for a while longer.* 
There was a lot to catch up on: they brought each other up 
to date on what they had been doing and what was going on 
with their friends. Eventually, the conversation became 
more general and drifted onto the topic of the different 
kinds of people there were in the world. Steve and Dan got 
to talking about idealistic people; they discussed idealism 
and how some people are more idealistic than others.
Self-Observation Ending
The more they talked about it, the more Dan began to 
wonder about himself. "Am I an idealistic person?" he 
thought. He then recalled many different occasions when he 
had felt idealistic and done, things that seemed to be 
idealistic. In the end, Dan decided that he really was an 
idealistic person, since he could remember many times when 
his actions and feelings were those of an idealistic person.
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Unsolicited Feedback Ending
The more they talked about it, the more Dan began to 
wonder about himself. "Am I an idealistic person?" he 
thought. As he was thinking about this, his friend said that 
Dan seemed to be an idealistic kind of person. In the end, 
Dan decided that he really was an idealistic person because 
Steve had said that Dan's actions and feelings were those 
of an idealistic person.
Solicited Feedback Ending
The more they talked about it, the more Dan began to 
wonder about himself. "Am I an idealistic person?" he 
thought. He decided that one way to find out if he was 
idealistic would be to ask Steve and see what he said. He 
did, and Steve thought about it for a moment before saying
t
that yes, Dan was an idealistic person. In the end, Dan 
decided that he really was an idealistic person because 
when he has asked, Steve had said that Dan’s actions and 
feelings, were those of an idealistic person.
Social Comparison Ending
The more they talked about it, the more Dan began to 
wonder about himself. "Am I an idealistic person?" he 
thought. He decided that one. way to find out if he was an 
idealistic person would be to compare himself with Steve.
Dan thought about his own actions and feelings compared to 
Steve’s. In the end, Dan decided that he really was an
‘
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idealistic person, since his actions and feelings were much 
more idealistic than Steve's.
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STORY 3
As Tom and Louis left class, they were deep in 
discussion about the day’s topic--abnormal psychology.
They didn't always like their psych class, but today was 
different. The lecturer talked about personality theory 
and abnormal psychology, which most of the class seemed to 
enjoy for the whole hour. As Tom and Louis were walking 
across campus, they were talking about personality types, 
and they got onto the topic of idealistic people. In 
particular, they were thinking of examples of people they 
knew who were idealistic and what it was about those people 
that made them idealistic.
Self-Observation Ending
As Tom was listening to Louis, be couldn’t help but 
wonder if he himself was idealistic. He remembered a 
number of times before college when he had been idealistic. 
Tom finally made up his mind that anyone who could recall, 
as he had, several instances of idealistic behaviors and 
emotions must be an idealistic person.
Unsolicited Feedback Ending
As Tom was listening to Louis, he couldn’t help but 
wonder if he himself was idealistic. Just then, Louis said,
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"Have you ever thought of yourself as an idealistic person? 
I think you fit the pattern pretty well." Tom finally made 
up his mind that anyone like himself who got feedback, 
without asking, that they were idealistic, must be an 
idealistic person.
Solicited Feedback Ending
As Tom was listening to Louis, he'couldn’t help but 
wonder if he himself was idealistic. Since they were 
talking about it, he asked Louis for his opinion. Louis’ 
reply was, "Yeah, I think you fit the pattern of an 
idealistic person pretty well." Tom finally made up his 
mind that anyone who asked for .feedback and was told he 
was idealistic, as Louis had told Tom, must be an 
idealistic person.
Social Comparison Ending
As Tom was listening to Louis, he couldn’t help but 
wonder if he himself was idealistic. He thought about how 
he stacked up in comparison to Louis when it came to 
idealistic actions and feelings, and found that he seemed 
more idealistic than his friend. Tom finally made up his 
mind that anyone who was more idealistic than a friend (as 
he was compared to Louis), must be an idealistic person.
STORY 4
Bill and Dave had just recently met at work, and they 
often talked about hunting and fishing during lunch. So 
one day last summer, the two friends decided to go on a 
short fishing trip. One Saturday they went to a nearby 
lake. The first couple of hours, the fish were really 
biting: Bill and Dave both caught several big ones. As
the morning wore on, the fish weren't biting as much, so 
Bill and Dave were doing more talking than fishing.
Although they hadn't known each other very long, they found 
they could talk easily about a lot of things. Soon they 
were discussing people and situations at work, and they 
found out that they both thought that their boss was an 
idealistic person.
Self-Observation Ending
While they talked about their boss, Bill began to 
think about what it meant to be an idealistic person. As 
he considered it, he began to recall times he had acted 
and felt like an idealistic person. Bill concluded that 
he really was idealistic. "After all," he thought, "there 
are so many times when I've behaved and felt like an 
idealistic person.”
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Unsolicited Feedback Ending
While they talked about their boss, Bill began to 
think about what it meant to be an idealistic person. At 
that point, Dave said, ’’You know, Bill, I’ve been thinking 
and you seem to me to be idealistic too.” Bill concluded 
that he really was idealistic. ’’After all,” he thought, 
"Dave brought it up and told me so."
Solicited Feedback Ending
While they talked about their boss, Bill began to 
think about what it meant to be an idealistic person. He 
asked Dave, "Hey, what about me? Do I seem idealistic to 
you?" David told Bill what he thought being idealistic was 
all about, and that he thought Bill fit the bill. Bill 
concluded that he really Was idealistic. "After all," he 
thought, "i asked Dave and he told me so."
Social Comparison Ending
While they talked about their boss, Bill began to 
think about what it meant to be an idealistic person. As 
he thought about this, he considered himself and Da\Te, and 
how they were, comparatively. Bill concluded that he 
really was idealistic, "After all," he thought, "I am a 
lot more idealistic than Dave."
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